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THE ASSOCIATIONAL FREEDOMS OF
PRIVATE MINORITY CLUBS
"The right of association is a very personal right and
anyone who tells you that you must associate with someone is
sticking his nose where it does not belong."1
INTRODUCTION
Private clubs have long played an important role in the social
environment of this nation. The policies of these clubs "evolved
from the members who formed them, in keeping with the social cus-
toms of the times.",3 The unfortunate result was the establishment of
private clubs owned and operated by whites who employed racially
discriminatory membership policies. The advent of the civil rights
movement and the passage of both federal 5 and state6 laws aimed at
1 Robert W. McGee, Hate Speech, Free Speech and the University, 24 AKRON L. REv.
363, 376 n.85 (1990).
2 See Fred L. Somers, Open or Closed Door?: In Club Wars, Privacy and Choice Battle
Freedom From Discrimination, Bus. L. TODAY, Nov.-Dec. 1994, at 26 (describing the historical
evolution of private social and recreational clubs).
3 Id. at 28.
4 See id.
5 Title H1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 is the basic federal statute guaranteeing equal
access to public accommodations. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000a (1970).
6 The role of state public accommodations acts ("PAAs") is discussed at infra Part 1I(A).
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eradicating discrimination against African-Americans in public ac-
commodations gave courts ammunition with which to invalidate such
policies. Those courts were nevertheless left with the conundrum of
how to apply such laws to clubs that claimed a shield of constitutional
protection. In response, the Supreme Court developed an elaborate
framework within which courts weigh the associational freedoms of
clubs against the compelling nature of a governmental interest in
eliminating discrimination.7
In recent decades, however, the traditional image of discrimina-
tion has shifted; the nation has seen a trend toward the formation of
private clubs by African-Americans employing racially discrimina-
tory admission policies to keep out whites.8 This upsurge will likely
force courts to confront the issue of whether anti-discrimination laws
enacted to provide equal rights for African-Americans can be invoked
by whites seeking admittance to all-minority clubs.
This Note analyzes the conflict between the freedom of expres-
sive association enjoyed by private African-American groups and
public accommodation laws. Part I illustrates the most recent exam-
ple of this problem-a suit brought by a white woman excluded from
a meeting held by the United African Movement, a private all-black
club. Part II outlines the framework established by the Supreme Court
to be used by courts in dealing with issues of associational freedom.
Part Ill analyzes the substance of the constitutional protection Afri-
can-American clubs may invoke in defense of their race-based poli-
cies. Finally, Part IV applies the framework prescribed by the Su-
preme Court, comparing the states' interest in eradicating discrimina-
tion with clubs' associational freedom.
7 See New York State Club Ass'n v. City of New York, 487 U.S. 1 (1988) (holding that
the application of a human rights law to a private club was not an unconstitutional infringement
on the rights of club members); Board of Dirs. of Rotary Int'l v. Rotary Club, 481 U.S. 537
(1987) (deciding that a private organization was covered by the language of a California Civil
Rights Act prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sex or race); Roberts v. United States
Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984) (determining that Minnesota Human Rights Act, prohibiting dis-
crimination on the basis of sex, was applicable to a private, male-only club).
8 See, e.g., Karen Avenoso, Blacks-Only Event Faulted by Parents; Amherst School
Draws Criticism, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 6, 1997, at B1 (describing a "blacks-only" breakfast
sponsored by public school); Blacks Only; Segregated Meeting: Dividing City Council Members
by Race Doesn't Help Baltimore, BALTIMORE SUN, Jan. 27, 1996, at 8A (describing the Afri-
can-American Coalition of the Baltimore City Council); Robert Holland, Surveying Some Words
and Ideas that Are Hot in Academia, RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH, May 29, 1996, at A9 (de-
scribing "all-blaclk" university dormitories at Wesleyan University); Jeff Jacoby, The Long
Retreat Back to 'Separate-But-Equal,' BALTIMORE SUN, Nov. 26, 1996, at 13A (describing a
"blacks-only" English 101 class at San Bernadino Community College); New Hampshire Afri-
can-Americans Form Support Group (National Public Radio broadcast, Mar. 4, 1996) (describ-
ing "For Blacks Only," a "blacks-oniy" private club); Gregor W. Pinney, New Hamline Policy
Lets Minority Groups Limit Membership, STAR-TRIBUNE, Dec. 16, 1993, at 1B (describing
university policy allowing formation of "all-black" student groups).
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I. BACKGROUND
A. The United African Movement
The United African Movement ("UAM") was borne of the po-
litical and racial uproar following the allegations of rape and kidnap-
ping made by Tawana Brawley in 1988.9 The men who had brought
the allegations to light and stood behind Brawley as her most vocal
supporters were swept up in a maelstrom of controversy. These
"masterminds of the Tawana Brawley hoax"' 1° -Rev. Al Sharpton,
one of the nation's most bellicose civil rights leaders, Alton Maddox,
Jr., a black nationalist who served as Brawley's attorney, and C.
Vernon Mason, Maddox's longtime assistant-were largely discred-
ited by lingering accusations that they had in fact masterminded and
carried out the fraudulent incident to stir up racial animus."1 These
three civil rights activists formed the UAM later that year in an effort
to maintain their position in the African-American community while
attempting to regain a portion of the ground their cause had lost be-
cause of the Brawley fiasco. 12
The UAM was founded in honor of Marcus Garvey, "an advo-
cate for the creation of 'a separate Black nation., 1 3 In order to fur-
ther its goal of providing African-Americans "'sanctuary' . .. from
persons who harbor racial animus toward Africans, 14 the UAM es-
9 Brawley alleged that she was kidnapped by a group of six white men as she stepped off
a school bus, then raped and beaten in the woods. Brawley was found four days later covered in
feces with racial epithets written across her chest. See Michael H. Cottman, Race-Sex Attack
Enrages a Town, NEWSDAY, Dec. 20, 1987, at 15.
1o Christine B. Whelan, No Whites Allowed, WALL ST. J., Sept. 5, 1997, at A12.
1 The grand jury investigating the Brawley case eventually concluded that there was no
evidence to support Brawley's charges. See No Evidence of Cops' Role in Rape: Report,
NEWSDAY, Apr. 9, 1988, at 4. Steven Pagones, a New York prosecutor who was publicly named
by Maddox as being "involved in the Brawley rape," brought a $75 million lawsuit for defama-
tion of character and intentional infliction of emotional distress. See Will Haygood, In the Shad-
ows of Doubt: Lawyer's Suit Revives Lingering Questions, Pain in Tawana Brawley Case,
BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 16, 1997, at Al. Pagones was later awarded $345,000 in compensatory
and punitive damages. See Tawana Brawley Must Pay $135,000 to Man She Accused, SEATTLE
TIES, Oct. 11, 1998, at A20. In a later ruling, Brawley was ordered to pay Pagones $5000 in
compensatory damages and $180,000 in punitive damages.
12 Today, the UAM is directed by Maddox, with Sharpton and Mason having resigned
their posts in the early 1990's due to ideological differences. See Peter Noel, Attorneys At War:
Alton Maddox and C. Vernon Mason Are Prohibited from Practicing Law, but No One Can
Silence Their Rage, THE VILLAGE VOICE, Dec. 3, 1996, at 41.
13 New York City Comm'n on Human Rights v. United African Movement, No. MPA95-
0851/PA95-0031, at 4 ( N.Y.C.C.H.R. June 30, 1997) (recommended decision and order) (cita-
tion omitted). Garvey was the founder of the Universal Negro Improvement Association and has
been dubbed by at least one commentator to be "the most influential African-American leader in
the years following World War I." CLARENCE PAGE, SHOWING MY COLOR: IMPOLITE ESSAYS
ON RACE AND IDENTITY 134 (1996).
14 Whelan, supra note 10, at A12 (quoting Alton Maddox).
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pouses a "non-assimilationist 15 doctrine. The group, formed "to lift
African people from the cycle of dependency on European largess
and whims," considers this philosophy essential.16  To accomplish
this lofty goal, the UAM has been active on several fronts, asserting
itself as the mouthpiece of a large percentage of the African-
American community. 7  Through organized public demonstrations
and rallies, the UAM has involved itself as a major player in virtually
every racial incident occurring in New York City over the last dec-
ade. 8 The UAM also has endorsed political candidates and, in sev-
eral instances, has proposed its own candidates for local offices. 19
The focus of the UAM's activities is its weekly meetings at the
Slave One Theater in New York City,20 a cavernous hall decorated
with portraits capturing the atrocities of American slavery and cele-
brating African-American heroes from the past.2' The meetings'
"free exchange of African-centered ideas," 22 offer a variety of Afri-
can-American ideologies and politics ranging from the inflammatory
racial rhetoric of Khallid Muhammed to lectures on Egyptian civili-
15 New York City Comm'n on Human Rights v. United African Movement, No. MPA95-
0851/PA95-0031, at 4 (N.Y.C.C.H.R. June 30, 1997) (recommended decision and order).
16id.
17 The group has been dubbed "'the CNN of the ghetto."' Noel, supra note 12, at 41 (ci-
tations omitted).
18 Perhaps the group's most controversial move was its support for Anton McCray, one of
the African-American youths charged in connection with, and later convicted of, the infamous
"Central Park Jogger Rape." The UAM gathered funds in excess of $23,000 to post bail for the
defendant. See Park Rape Suspect McCray Out On Bail, NEWSDAY, Dec. 9, 1989, at 16. The
remaining $2000 needed to pay Anton McCray's $25,000 bail was donated directly by the
UAM. See id.; see also Timothy Clifford, Mom: If Guilty, He Should Be Punished but 'I Know
... He Didn't Do It,' NEWSDAY, Apr. 26, 1989, at 5 (describing the racial overtones involved in
the case). The UAM later petitioned for, and was denied, friend-of-the-court status in the case.
See Jim Dwyer, 'Selective' Healing and More on Death, NEWSDAY, Aug. 6,1990, at 2.
19 In 1994, the UAM made a bid to secure ballot access for the Freedom Party and its
slate of candidates. See New York City Comm'n on Human Rights v. United African Move-
ment, No. MPA95-0851/PA95-0031, at 4-5 (N.Y.C.C.H.R. June 30, 1997) (recommended deci-
sion and order). In fact, one of the UAM's first initiatives was to compose a slate of 45 candi-
dates for school board elections. See Merle English & Jane Huth, Brooklyn Closeup: 24 Run-
ning in School District 13, NEWSDAY, Mar. 21, 1989, at 23. In addition, Sharpton himself has
been a Democratic contender for Mayor of New York City on several occasions. See Campaigns
of '97 New York City Mayor: Making Peace With Al Sharpton, AMERICAN POLITICAL
NETwORK-THE HOTLINE, Dec. 18, 1996, at 18.
20 The "Slave One" moniker was chosen to "represent a background of enslavement
shared by persons of different races." New York City Comm'n on Human Rights v. United
African Movement, No. MPA95-0851/PA95-0031, at 5 (N.Y.C.C.H.R. June 30, 1997) (recom-
mended decision and order). Since the Southgate incident described below, infra Part I(B), the
UAM has conducted its meetings at a Masonic temple, a "private" lodge under New York law,
thereby making the group's segregated meetings legal. See Peter Noel, No Whites Allowed:
Inside the United African Movement, THE VILLAGE VOICE, Mar. 18, 1997, at 50.
21 See Noel, supra note 20 (describing the Slave One Theater).22 Whelan, supra note 10, at A12.
23 Muhammed, the self-proclaimed "flaming tongue," is best known for his falling out
with the Nation of Islam and its leader, Louis Farrakhan, over blatantly anti-Semitic remarks
made by Muhammed. See DINESH D'SOUZA, THE END OF RACISM 401 (1993). His speeches at
the Slave One, unsurprisingly, were of the same racial tenor. For example, Muhammed once
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zation given by the octogenarian historian John Henrik Clarke 24 The
former site of UAM meetings has been described by one observer this
way: "The Slave [One Theater] was a '90's version of the soapbox,
that street lectern from which Harlem's ample supply of black nation-
alists, preachers, and politicians kept alive the African institution of
communal self-criticism and launched searingprotests against the ill-
treatment of blacks dating back to the 1930s.'
The role the UAM meetings play within the local African-
American community can best be summed up by Mr. Muhammed
himself, who described them as "'the blackest thing happenin' on a
Wednesday night."' 26  In order to maintain this atmosphere of "in-
your-face Afrocentrism ' 27 at the meetings, the UAM maintained a
strict "blacks-only" admission policy. 8 As Mr. Muhammed once told
a Slave One audience, "[y]ou can bring anybody here you want to as
long as they look like us .... [T]his house is for the descendants of
slaves." 29
B. The Case Against the UAM
In July 1994, the UAM scheduled noted Harvard theologian
Cornel West, a well-known author and advocate of racial integration
and tolerance,30 as a speaker at its weekly meeting.31 Due to West's
prominence and national recognition, the UAM advertised his appear-
ance over the radio in the preceding days. 2 These advertisements
piqued the curiosity of Minoo Southgate, a self-styled "advocacy
told a Slave One crowd that if one found his speeches to be too caustic, "[s]omebody ...
.should slap you upside the head with truth until your wig is straight on your nappy, silly hair."'
Noel, supra note 20, at 50.
24 Clarke teaches that the world's first civilization sprung from Africa '"before the first




28 See New York City Comm'n on Human Rights v. United African Movement, No.
MPA95-0851/PA95-0031, at 4 (N.Y.C.C.H.R. June 30, 1997) (recommended decision and
order) ("UAM members asserted their 'absolute refusal to allow Caucasians' to its Wednesday
evening forums.").
2 Noel, supra note 20, at 50. The full quote displays Mr. Muhammed's usual racial tenor:
"'We ain't got but a little room in here. We can't fill it up with the Vietnamese. Can't fill it up
with the Chinese. We can't fill it up with the Frenchman. We can't fill it up with the German.
We can't fill it up with the fake Jew. The Greek. The Freak."' Id.
30 See generally MICHAEL LERNER & CORNEL WEST, JEWS AND BLACKS: LET THE
HEALING BEGIN (1995); CORNEL WEST, RACE MATTERS (1993).31See New York City Comm'n on Human Rights v. United African Movement, MPA95-
085 I/PA95-003 1, at 7 (N.Y.C.C.H.R. June 30, 1997) (recommended decision and order). Due to
community inquiry, the UAM published information regarding its events in which a distinction
was drawn: UAM sponsored meetings held at forums other than the Slave One were open to all
those "who truly identiflied] with the oppressor" and were advertised as such, while the public-
ity for the weekly Slave One meetings made no such waiver of the group's institutional "blacks-
only" policy. Id. at 6.32 See id.
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journalist" with a reputation of harassing black activists.33 Aware of
the UAM's admission policies, Southgate went to the Slave One to
hear West only after she was assured by a UAM telephone operator
that she would be admitted.34 Upon arrival, however, Southgate, who
is of Iranian and Jewish descent, was immediately asked to leave be-
cause, as she was told, "'[t]his place is only for African people' ....
'Caucasians are not allowed here."' 35 Southgate was barraged with
anti-Semitic threats, and eventually forced to leave without hearing
the lecture.36
Southgate immediately filed a complaint with the New York
City Human Rights Commission (the "Commission") claiming that
the UAM's "blacks-only" policy violated the New York City Human
Rights Law (the "New York Act"). 37 The provision at issue reads:
It shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice for any per-
son being the . . . provider of public accommodation be-
cause of the actual or perceived race, creed, color.., of any
person directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or
deny to such person any of the accommodations, advan-
tages, facilities or privileges thereof ....
The New York Act defines "provider of public accommodation"
as "providers . . . of goods, services, facilities, accommodations, ad-
vantages or privileges of any kind, and places, . . . where goods,
services, facilities, accommodations, advantages or privileges of any
kind are extended, offered, sold, or otherwise made available.
' 9
"Private" clubs are not within the scope of the New York Act, but the
New York Act states a club will not be considered "private if it has
more than four hundred members, provides regular meal service and
regularly receives payment for dues, fees, use of space, facilities,
services, meals, beverages directly or indirectly from or on behalf of
non-members for the furtherance of trade or business.
' 4°
In its investigation of Southgate's complaint, the Commission
sent three "testers," two Caucasian men and an African-American
woman, to attend two separate weeknight meetings at the Slave One;
33 See id. For example, Southgate has in print referred to Maddox as a "courtroom ter-
rorist." Id. at 7.
34 See id.35 Id. at8.
36 See id.
37 See Whelan, supra note 10, at A12.
38 N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-107(4)(a) (1997).




the woman was admitted while both men were verbally harassed and
denied admission.4'
Fueled by these results, Southgate and the Commission4 2 filed
suit against the UAM seeking $100,000 punitive damages, the maxi-
mum allowed under the New York Act as well as an injunction re-
quiring the UAM to conduct its meetings in a manner consistent with
the Act's definition of a "private event" either by ceasing to issue an-
nouncements for the meetings in the media, or by specifying in those
announcements that the forums are for UAM members only.43 In
June 1997, the Senior Administrative Judge of the New York Com-
mission on Human Rights ruled that the UAM had in fact illegally
discriminated against Southgate because of her race, thereby entitling
her to $2000 in compensation for mental anguish*4 The UAM was
also ordered to pay the City of New York $5000 in civil penalties. 45
Finally, the judge ordered the UAM to conduct its weekly meeting in
a manner consistent with the New York Act's definition of "pri-
vate."
46
II. THE RIGHT TO DISCRIMINATE
A. Defining Freedom of Expression: The Roberts Trilogy
Although it is not expressly recognized in the Constitution, the
Supreme Court has long acknowledged a right to freedom of associa-
tion. In NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson,47 its first extensive dis-
cussion of that right, the Court stated:
Effective advocacy of both public and private points of
view, particularly controversial ones, is undeniably en-
41 See New York City Comm'n on Human Rights v. United African Movement, No.
MPA95-0851/PA95-0031, at 10-11 (N.Y.C.C.H.R. June 30, 1997) (recommended decision and
order).
42 When the Commission finds "probable cause," the case proceeds to an administrative
hearing, in which the Commission's legal staff intervenes as plaintiff. See Michael H. Schill,
Local Enforcement of Laws Prohibiting Discrimination in Housing: The New York City Human
Rights Commission, 23 FORDHAM URB. UJ. 991, 1025 (1996).
43 See New York City Comm'n on Human Rights v. United African Movement, No.
MPA95-0851/PA95-0031, at 10-11, 28-29 (N.Y.C.C.H.R. June 30, 1997) (recommended deci-
sion and order).
44 See id. at 35. The $2000 award was later amended to $5000. New York City Comm'n
on Human Rights v. United African Movement, No. MPA95-0851/PA95-0031, at 2
(N.Y.C.C.H.R. Sept. 24, 1997) (decision and order). Southgate called the fine "'puny' and
stated that the ruling "'sends the message that some victims of discrimination are less equal than
others."' Whelan, supra note 10, at A12.
45 See New York City Comm'n on Human Rights v. United African Movement, No.
MPA95-085/PA95-0031, at 35 (N.Y.C.C.H.R. June 30, 1997) (recommended decision and
order).46 See id
47 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
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hanced by group association, as this Court has more than
once recognized by remarking upon the close nexus be-
tween the freedoms of speech and assembly. It is beyond
debate that freedom to engage in association for the ad-
vancement of beliefs and ideas is an inseparable aspect of
"liberty" assured by the Due Process Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment, which embraces freedom of speech.48
In the wake of Patterson, however, courts seemed to have diffi-
culty grappling with and defining this right which was, at best,
"amorphous." 49 The result was a system of jurisprudence wherein
courts interpreted "association" as "little more than a shorthand
phrase used.., to protect traditional first amendment rights of speech
and petition as exercised by individuals in groups."
50
The Supreme Court, in a trilogy of cases, took significant steps
during the 1980s towards dissipating the mists of uncertainty sur-
rounding the status of associational freedom. In Roberts v. United
States Jaycees,5 1 the Court reviewed the application of the Minnesota
Human Rights Act prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sex in
"places of public accommodation" to local chapters of the Jaycees, a
group in which full membership was available only to males.52 The
Roberts Court, in an opinion by Justice Brennan, established the
framework for interpreting the freedom of association as being com-
posed of two separate elements: the "freedom of intimate association
and [the] freedom of expressive association., 53  The Court subse-
quently employed this two-tiered approach in Board of Directors of
48 Id. at 460 (citations omitted).
49 See Cornerstone Bible Church v. City of Hastings, 740 F. Supp 654, 663 (D. Minn.
1990) (holding that a local zoning ordinance did not violate the freedom of association), rev'd
on other grounds, 948 F.2d 464 (8th Cir. 1991) (reversing summary judgement on the issues of
free speech, free exercise, equal protection and due process).
50 Reena Raggi, An Independent Right to Freedom of Association, 12 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L.
REV. 1 (1977) (arguing that in the cases since Patterson, the Court, in various instances, has
given very different interpretations of the freedom of association, resulting in a very narrow
conception of the right). Compare United States Dep't of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 541
(1973) (Douglas, J., concurring) ("[B]anding together is an expression of the right of freedom of
association that is very deep in our traditions."), with Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S.
1, 7 (holding that a local zoning ordinance prohibiting three or more persons from living to-
gether "involves no 'fundamental right' guaranteed by the Constitution, such as... the right of
association.") (citations omitted).
5' 468 U.S. 609 (1984).
52 See id. at 612-18.
-3 Id. at 618. One commentator has characterized the freedom of association as having
"at least three separate aspects": first, the right to "associate to achieve economic or other goals
that are unconnected to any fundamental constitutional right;" second, the "freedom to associate
.... connected to the fundamental right to privacy;" third, a "right to associate for the purpose
of engaging in types of activity expressly protected by the first amendment" analogous to the
Court's "expressive freedom." 4 R. ROTUNDA, ET AL, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:
SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE § 20.41, at 200-01 (1993).
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Rotary International v. Rotary Club.54 At issue in Rotary was the
application of California's Unruh Civil Rights Act55 which, like the
Minnesota Human Rights Act, provided that "[a]il persons ... are
free and equal, and no matter what their sex, [or] race. .. are entitled
to the full and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities, privi-
leges.., in all business establishments. 56 In both cases, the organi-
zations involved were found to be within the language of the applica-
ble statutes,57 and in both cases, the organizations claimed that en-
forcement of anti-discrimination acts would impinge on their freedom
of association. The Supreme Court held, in each of these cases, the
application of the states' PAAs to be constitutional, thereby eradicat-
ing the organizations' exclusive membership policies.
58
In New York State Club Ass'n v. City of New York,59 the final
case in the Roberts trilogy, a consortium of private clubs sought a
judgment declaring New York City's Human Rights Law, which pro-
hibited any discrimination by "any 'place of public accommodation,
resort or amusement,"' to be unconstitutional. 60 The reach of the
law's anti-discrimination provisions extended to any "institution, club
or place of accommodation [that] has more than four hundred mem-
bers, provides regular meal service and regularly receives payment
for dues, fees, use of space, facilities, services, meals or beverages
directly or indirectly from or on behalf of nonmembers for the fur-
therance of trade or business."'61 Like the Jaycees and the Rotary
Club, these private clubs argued that application of this anti-
discrimination law would unconstitutionally infringe upon their right
of freedom of association. Focusing on the definition of "expressive
association" employed in Roberts, the New York State Club Court
held that application of the law to the "private clubs" was not an un-
constitutional infringement the rights of club members. 62
1. Intimate Association
63
The framework established by this trilogy of cases has become
the default method of analysis for analyzing freedom of association
54 481 U.S. 537 (1987).
5 Cal. Civ. Code Ann. § 51 (West 1992).
56 Rotary, 481 U.S. at 541 n.2 (citations omitted).
57 See id. at 549-50; see also Roberts, 468 U.S. at 629-31.
58 See Rotary, 481 U.S. at 549; Roberts, 468 U.S. at 628-29.
59487 U.S. 1 (1988).
6o Id. at 4 (citations omitted).61 Id. at 6 (citations omitted).
62 See id. at 13-15.
63 The focus of this Note is on the "expressive association" prong of the Roberts frame-
work. For a more detailed analysis of the freedom of intimate association, see Edith M. Hoff-
meister, Comment, Women Need Not Apply: Discrimination and the Supreme Court's Intimate
Association Test, 28 U.S.F. L. Rev. 1009 (1994). See also Neal E. Devins, The Trouble with
Jaycees, 34 CATH. U. L. REV. 901,908 (1985).
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claims. 64 As defined by the Roberts Court, the freedom of intimate
association serves to protect "certain intimate relationships" from un-
due state intrusion; such "highly personal" associations "foster diver-
sity and act as critical buffers between the individual and the power of
the state."65 This dimension of association is based on the premise
that "the Bill of Rights... must afford the formation and preservation
of certain kinds of highly personal relationships" and some degree of
protection against governmental interference. The types of personal
commitments protected under this right, which include marriage, 67
childbirth68 and cohabitation with one's relatives, 69 "have played a
critical role in the culture and traditions of the Nation by cultivating
and transmitting shared ideals and beliefs." 70 In essence, freedom of
intimate association is an extension of the right of privacy.71  While
the precise contours of this privacy protection have never been ex-
pressly drawn,72 several objective factors have been specifically iden-
tified by the Court as benchmarks to be used in determining whether
an association is sufficiently personal to warrant constitutional pro-
tection, including size, selectivity, purpose and policies7 -- qualities
which help identify associations which are "likely to reflect the con-
siderations that have led to an understanding of freedom of associa-
tion as an intrinsic element of personal liberty."74 Thus, this "intrin-
6 See, e.g., Marshall v. Allen, 984 F.2d 787, 799 (7th Cir. 1993) (applying the two-tiered
Roberts analysis); Adkins v. Board of Educ., 982 F.2d 952, 955-56 (6th Cir. 1993) ("The Su-
preme Court has not backed away from its holding in Roberts. Rather, the existence of a con-
stitutional right to freedom of association was reaffirmed in [Rotary]."); In re Grand Jury Pro-
ceeding, 842 F.2d 1229, 1234-35 (1 lth Cir. 1988) (applying the tests outlined in Roberts).
65 Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 618-19 (1984); see also 4 R. ROTUNDA
ET AL, supra note 53, § 20A1, at 250-51 (arguing that "[t]he rationale for protecting these rela-
tionships could provide a basis for active judicial review of laws restricting the ability of per-
sons to enter into highly personal associations such as prohibitions on prison marriages and
visitation rights") (citation omitted).
6Roberts, 468 U.S. at 618.
67 See Zablocki v. Redhall, 434 U.S. 374, 383-86 (1978) (invalidating a statute which re-
quired residents with children that they were under an obligation to support to obtain court
approval to remarry).
68 See Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 684-86 (1977) (holding that a pro-
hibition on the distribution of contraceptives burdens the right of individuals to practice birth
control and serves no compelling interest).
69 See Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S 494, 504-06 (1977) (overturning a con-
viction for violations of a city ordinance limiting the occupancy of a single family dwelling to
members of the "family" on "due process" grounds). But see Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas,
416 U.S. 1 (1974) (refusing to apply the constitutional protection of intimate association to a
group of students living together).
70 Roberts, 468 U.S. at 618-19.
71 See generally Devins, supra note 63, at 903-10 (discussing the constitutional connec-
tion between the fundamental rights of privacy and association).
72 See Board of Dirs. of Rotary Int'l v. Rotary Club, 481 U.S. 537, 545 (1987) ("We have
not attempted to mark the precise boundaries of [freedom of intimate association].").
73 See id. at 546; Roberts, 468 U.S. at 620.
74 Roberts, 468 U.S. at 620; accord Louisiana Debating and Literary Ass'n v. City of
New Orleans, 42 F.3d 1483, 1493 n.15 (5th Cir. 1995).
[Vol. 49:359
FOR BLACKS ONLY
sic" feature of constitutionally protected association is available to "a
broad range of human relationships." 75
2. Expressive Association
The second flavor of constitutionally protected associational
right recognized by the Roberts trilogy is the "freedom of expressive
association." The Court recognized the "close nexus" between free-
dom and assembly upon which expressive association is founded as
early as the Patterson decision.76 As defined by the Roberts Court,
this freedom entails the "right to associate for the purpose of engaging
in those activities protected by the First Amendment-speech, assem-
bly, petition for the redress of grievances, and the exercise of relig-
ion."" Rather than being an extension of free speech, this "instru-
mental" aspect of the freedom of association is an "implicit... corre-
sponding right [to the First Amendment] to associate with others in
pursuit of a wide variety of political, social, economic, educational,,,78
religious, and cultural ends. This umbrella of constitutionality
protects the expressive rights of associations not only against "heavy-
handed frontal attack[s], but also from being stifled by more subtle
governmental interference." 79 Courts have invoked this ideal to pro-
tect expressive groups formed to advocate minority points of view80
as well as non-minority organizations advocating the right to be free
from intrusion by minority groups.81
75 Roberts, 468 U.S. at 620.
76 See NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958) ("Effective advo-
cacy of both public and private points of view, particularly controversial ones, is undeniably
enhanced by group association."); South Boston Allied War Veterans Council v. City of Boston,
875 F. Supp. 891, 914 (D. Mass. 1995) ('The First Amendment right of expressive association
merges the rights of speech and assembly to serve vital interests in our democracy.").
77 Roberts, 468 U.S. at 618.
78 Id. at 622; see also Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 233 (1977) ("Our de-
cisions establish with unmistakable clarity that the freedom of an individual to associate for the
purpose of advancing beliefs and ideas is protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments.');
William P. Marshall, Discrimination and the Right of Association, 81 Nw. U. L. REV. 68, 77
(1986) ("Limiting the right of expression to the cries of a lone speaker hardly would promote
the interchange of ideas envisioned in the first amendment [sic].").
79 Lyng v. Int'l Union, 485 U.S. 360, 367 n.5 (1988) (quoting Bates v. City of Little
Rock, 361 U.S. 516,523 (1960)).
80 See NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 419-20, 429 (1963) (rejecting a Virginia ban on
lawyer solicitation aimed at the NAACP and the NAACP Defense Fund because, for the
NAACP, litigation was a "form of political expression"); Patterson, 357 U.S. at 453 (stating
that expressive freedom gave the NAACP the right to refuse to disclose membership records to
state officials).
81 See South Boston Allied War Veterans Council, 875 F. Supp. at 915-17 (holding that
making the issuance of a parade permit to a veterans' group conditional upon the inclusion of a
gay and lesbian group violated the veterans' tights of expressive association).
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3. Freedom from Association
A corollary right presupposed by the freedom of association and
thus encompassed within this net of constitutional protection is the
freedom not to associate. This "negative counterpart" to the "positive
right" of freedom of association was first clearly explicated by the
Supreme Court in dealing with a state statute that allowed for the es-
tablishment of "agency shop arrangements" in which both union and
non-union employees were compelled to pay union dues as a condi-
tion of their employment. 83  In Abood v. Detroit Board of Educa-
tion,84 the Court held that workers may constitutionally prevent the
union from using portions of those "dues" to contribute to political
candidates and to express unrelated political views.85 The Abood
Court stated:
The fact that the appellants are compelled to make, rather
than prohibited from making, contributions for political pur-
poses works no less an infringement of their constitutional
rights. For at the heart of the First Amendment is the notion
that an individual should be free to believe as he will, and
that in a free society one's beliefs should be shaped by his
mind and his conscience rather than coerced by the State.86
Within the framework of developing its two-tiered analysis of
associational freedom, the Roberts Court gave a very broad scope to
this language by stating simply, "[f]reedom of association.., plainly
presupposes a freedom not to associate., 87  Based on the Roberts
analysis, the freedom not to associate has become a vital factor in the
analysis not simply of issues of compelled payments, but rather of all
First Amendment claims of expressive association, an expansive ap-
proach which has been followed by a majority of courts.88 Indeed, as
Laurence Tribe has written, "freedom of association would prove an
empty guarantee if associations could not limit control over their de-
82 LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 12-26, at 1014 (2d ed.
1988). 83 SeeAbood, 431 U.S. at 211-14.
84 431 U.S. 209 (1977).
81 See id. at 234-37.
86 Id. at 234-35 (citation omitted).
87 Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 623 (1984) (citing Abood, 431 U.S. at
234-35) (emphasis added). The Roberts Court interpreted the Abood holding in the context of
its discussion of unconstitutional governmental infringements on an association's right of ex-
pressive association. In its view, Abood's forced payments for unrelated political views was
analogous to the forced inclusion of unwanted members in an organization, the clearest example
of such disallowed infringement. See id.
88 See, e.g., New York State Club Ass'n v. City of New York, 487 U.S. 1, 13 (1988)
(recognizing the right of associations to "exclude individuals who do not share the views that
the club's members wish to promote...").
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cisions to those who share the interests and persuasions that underlie
the association's being."89
B. Limiting Expressive Association
1. Evidentiary Standard
The freedom of expressive association, while very broad in its
scope, is subject to several important limitations. First, for a group to
claim such constitutional protection, it must meet the high evidentiary
standard established in NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson 90 and
Buckley v. Valeo.91 Under this standard, an association has the obli-
gation of proving that the harm it suffered as the result of an in-
fringement upon its associational rights amounts to something more
than mere speculation.
In Patterson, the Court reviewed an order by the state of Ala-
bama requiring the NAACP to produce records including the names
and addresses of all its members and agents. 92 The NAACP, fearing
governmental harassment and restriction, refused to comply, arguin
that the order violated its First and Fourteenth Amendment rights.
In ruling that enforcement of the government's order would constitute
a restraint on the NAACP's right of expressive association, the Court
stated that the organization had "made an uncontroverted showing
that on past occasions revelation of the identity of its rank-and-file
members [had] exposed these members to economic reprisal, loss of
employment, threat of physical coercion, and other manifestations of
public hostility." 94
Eighteen years later, in its review of the constitutionality of the
Federal Election Campaign Act (the "Campaign Act"), the Supreme
Court stated that "[t]he strict test established by [Patterson] is neces-
sary because compelled disclosure has the potential for substantially
infringing the exercise of First Amendment rights." 95  At issue in
Buckley were provisions of the Act which obligated political com-
89 TRIBE, supra note 82, § 12-26, at 1014, quoted in Democratic Party v. Wisconsin ex
rel. LaFollette, 450 U.S. 107, 122 n.22 (1981) (citation omitted). "For rights to associate with X
are necessarily rights to dissociate with Y .... There is little meaning in a right to associate at
home with family ... if one is unable to invoke police assistance in expelling intruders, be they
neighbors or FBI agents." Id. § 15-17, at 1401. In Tribe's analysis, a group's right not to asso-
ciate with certain individuals or organizations is a protection granted by the state, whereas the
right of expressive association is a protection from the state itself. See id.
90 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
' 424 U.S. 1 (1976).92 See Patterson, 357 U.S. at 449, 451-52.
93 See id. at 453-54.
94 Id. at 462 (emphasis added).
9 5Buckley, 424 U.S. at 66.
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mittees and candidates to keep detailed records of contributions and
expenditures, and to file quarterly reports disclosing the names and
addresses of campaign contributors and amounts contributed.
96
Holding that no violation of political candidates' expressive freedom
had been shown, the Court stated: "[N]o appellant in this case has
tendered record evidence of the sort proffered in [Patterson]. Instead,
appellants primarily rely on 'the clearly articulated fears of individu-
als, well experienced in the political process." ' 97 Thus, based on the
evidence before the Court, any suggestion that First Amendment
rights had been violated would have been "highly speculative." 98
Under this standard, in order for governmental action to be
deemed "harmful" or in violation of a group's expressive association,
it must be intrusive, and have an actual impact on the group's exercise
of its First Amendment freedoms.99 Courts have recognized at least
two different types of "harmful" impact:1°° (1) governmental action
that may have a detrimental effect on the group's message,' 10 or (2)
action that may deter individuals from associating with the organiza-
tion.'02
As pointed out by the Roberts Court, such governmental action
may take several forms, including "impos[ing] penalties or with-
hold[ing] benefits from individuals because of their membership in a
disfavored group .... require[d] disclosure of the fact of membership
in a group seeking anonymity, [and] interfere[nce] with the internal
96 See id. at 62-63. The Campaign Act defined "'political committee' . . . as a group of
persons that receives 'contributions' or makes 'expenditures' of over $1000 in a calendar year."
Id. at 62.
97 Id. at 71 (citation omitted).
98 See id. at 70; see also Cornerstone Bible Church v. City of Hastings, 740 F. Supp. 654,
664 (D. Minn. 1990) (reaffirming the Patterson/Buckley burden of proof in claims of expressive
association), rev'd on other grounds, 948 F.2d 464 (8th Cir. 1991).
99 See Salvation Army v. Dep't of Community Affairs, 919 F.2d 183, 200 (3d Cir. 1990)
("Roberts also made clear that the government action must not only be 'intrusive,' but must
have an actual, rather than speculative, impact on the group in its exercise of... expression.").
'00 See id. at 200-01.
101 See, e.g., Democratic Party v. Wisconsin ex rel LaFollette, 450 U.S. 107 (1981)
(holding that a Wisconsin election law binding a national party to honor primary results, even
though such results were reached in manner contrary to national party rules, violated the asso-
ciational freedom of the Democratic Party); South Boston Allied War Veterans' Council v. City
of Boston, 875 F. Supp. 891, 914 (D. Mass. 1995) (holding that city could not issue parade
permit conditional upon allowing gay and lesbian group to participate because doing so would
"confuse and mute the Veterans' message"); Invisible Empire of the Knights of the KKK v.
Mayor of Thurmont, 700 F. Supp. 281,289 (D. Md. 1988) (holding that city could not impose a
nondiscrimination condition on the grant of a parade permit because doing so would "change
the primary message" of the parade entry).
102 See, e.g., NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 462-63 (1958) ("[W]e
think it apparent that compelled disclosure of ... membership is likely to affect adversely the
ability of petitioner and its members to pursue their collective effort to foster beliefs which they
admittedly have the right to advocate, in that it may induce members to withdraw from the
Association and dissuade others from joining it because of fear of exposure of their beliefs
shown through their associations and of the consequences of this exposure.").
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organization or affairs of the group." 103 The clearest example of such
"internal interference," as noted by the Roberts Court, is "a regulation
that forces the group to accept members it does not desire." 1°4 Courts
have had several opportunities to review the invasive impacts of gov-
ernmental action on associations. 105 While the majority of disputed
governmental actions have been direct attacks on expressive freedom,
indirect restraints may also be held unconstitutional, but only if such
actions "'directly and substantially' interfere with [a group's] ability
to associate by 'order[ing]' people not to associate or 'prevent[ing]'
their ability to do so or 'burden[ing]' their ability to do so 'in any sig-
nificant manner."'
106
In Roberts, the Jaycees argued that compelled inclusion of
women as full-fledged members in compliance with Minnesota's
Human Rights Act would work an unconstitutional suppression of its
freedom of expressive association. 07 In evaluating the effect such
inclusion would have on the Jaycees, an all-male organization, the
Court found that the group had "failed to demonstrate that the Act
imposes any serious burdens on the male members' freedom of ex-
pressive association."'0 8 While it recognized that the association in-
deed enjoyed a "freedom not to associate" with certain individuals of
its choice, the Court focused on the activities in which the Jaycees
participated, a substantial part of which consisted of "political, eco-
nomic, cultural, and social affairs." 9 These activities, according to
the Court, would in no way be impeded by the inclusion of women.
"The Act require[d] no change in the Jaycees' creed.., and it im-
pose[d] no restrictions on the organization's ability to exclude indi-
103 Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 622-23 (1984) (citations omitted).
1o4 Id. at 623; see also William Buss, Discrimination by Private Clubs, 67 WASH. U. L.Q.
815, 844 (1989) ('There can be no clearer example of an intrusion into the internal structure or
affairs of an association than a regulation that forces the group to accept members that it does
not desire. Such a regulation may impair the ability of the original members to express only
those views that brought them together.")
'o5 See, e.g., Eu v. San Francisco County Democratic Cent. Comm., 489 U.S. 214, 231
(1989) (holding that restrictions within the California Elections Code governing the organization
and composition of the governing bodies of political parties, limiting terms of office, and re-
quiring the rotation of committee chairs between residents of Northern and Southern California
constituted a "burden [on] the associational rights of political parties"); cf. Salvation Army v.
Dep't of Community Affairs, 919 F.2d 183 (3d Cir. 1990) (holding that provisions of New
Jersey Rooming and Boarding House Act of 1979, granting residents of such facilities certain
rights, including the right to privacy and to practice the religion of their choice, does not alter
the Salvation Army's "message"); Pathfinder Fund v. Agency for Int'l Dev., 746 F. Supp. 192,
196 (D.D.C. 1990) ("[A] First Amendment violation is not found if governmental action has
merely made it somewhat more difficult for domestic organizations to associate with the organi-
zations of their choice.").
106 Pathfinder Fund, 746 F. Supp. at 195 (quoting Lyng v. International Union, 485 U.S.
360,367 n.5 (1988)).
107 See Roberts, 468 U.S. at 612-18.
'
0
' Id. at 626.
109 Id. (citations omitted).
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viduals with [differing] ideologies .... 110 Moreover, while women
could not participate as full members under existing rules, the Jaycees
in fact allowed women to participate in Jaycees-sponsored auxiliary
groups.111 "Accordingly, any claim that admission of women as full
voting members will impair a symbolic message conveyed by the
very fact that women are not permitted to vote is attenuated at
best."'
, 12
Three years later, in Board of Directors of Rotary International
v. Rotary Club,113 the Court relied on its Roberts decision to hold that
forced inclusion of women into local chapters of the Rotary Club, in
compliance with California's Civil Rights Act, did not violate that
group's freedom of expressive association.11 4 The Rotary Court justi-
fied its conclusion on the fact that such inclusion "does not require
[Rotary Club members] to abandon their basic goals .... Nor does it
require them to abandon their classification system or admit members
who do not reflect a cross section of the community.'15 In essence,
the compelled inclusion of women in the Rotary Club did not alter the
group's purpose in any fundamental way.
2. Narrow Definition of "Association"
A second means by which courts limit the freedom of expressive
association is by giving a narrow definition to "association." The
purpose of the First Amendment protections of free speech and ex-
pressive association is, in its broadest sense, to protect the market-
place of ideas.116  Many courts, however, have drawn a distinction
between groups that qualify as "associations" merely in a literal
sense, and those that are associations "for the advancement of beliefs
and ideas."117 The Supreme Court has recognized that while expres-
sive association may be inferred from a variety of activities other than
talking or writing, such "kernels of expression" as may be found in
10 Id. at 627.
111 See id.
112 Id. (citations omitted).
113 481 U.S. 537 (1987).
114 See id. at 548-49.
"' Id. at 548.
116 According to Justice Holmes, "[w]hen men have realized that time has upset many
fighting faiths, they may come to believe even more than they believe the very foundations of
their own conduct that the ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas--that
the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the
market, and that truth is the only ground upon which their wishes safely can be carried out. That
at any rate is the theory of our Constitution." Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630
(1919). Courts have defined this "market" as including "the public expression ideas, narratives,
concepts, imagery, opinions ... to an audience whom the speaker seeks to inform, edify, or
entertain." Swank v. Smart, 898 F.2d 1247, 1251 (7th Cir. 1990).
117 NAACP v. Alabama ex reL Patterson, 357 U.S. 449,460 (1958).
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even the most mundane of human relationships, do not necessarily
implicate constitutional protection under the First Amendment.
178
Courts have accordingly refused to recognize as "expressive associa-
tions" casual encounters between teenagers in dance halls 19 and cas-
ual conversation between friends or acquaintances.1 20 By drawing
such distinctions, courts prevent "constitutionally protected expres-
sion" from becoming redefined as "the totality of expression.
12
'
3. Narrow Definition of "Public Accommodations"
Finally, a court can limit the constitutional protection they grant
to a group's "associational freedoms" by its interpretation of the
"public accommodations" language in a given anti-discrimination
law. 22 If an organization is not within the realm of those to be regu-
lated by PAAs, then it can be distinguished as a "private" club, leav-
ing questions about the extent of its expressive purpose moot. mus-
trative of the issue is the ongoing battle over the inclusion of groups
such as homosexuals and atheists into the Boy Scouts of America
("BSA"). In Welsh v. Boy Scouts of America, a prospective Boy
Scout was denied admission to the BSA because he refused to affirm
his belief in God in violation of the Boy Scout oath. 124 This would-be
Scout argued his exclusion violated Title II of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 which prohibits discrimination in "any place of public accom-
modation."'  Focusing on the delineation of entities within Title II's
jurisdiction,'26 the court ruled that the phrase "public accommoda-
tion" includes only entities which "(1) 'serve] the public' and (2)
may be classified as an 'establishment,' 'place,' or 'facility.""' 127 Un-
der this definition, the BSA was held not to be such a "place of public
accommodation" because it lacked the required connection to a "par-
18 See City of Dallas v. Stanglin, 490 U.S. 19,25 (1989).
19 See id. at 24-25 (upholding a city ordinance restricting admission to certain dance
halls to persons between the ages of 14 and 18).
" See Swank, 898 F.2d at 1251 ("Casual chit-chat between two persons or otherwise
confined to a small social group is ... not protected. Such conversation is important to its par-
ticipants but not to the ... objectives, values, and consequences of the speech that is protected
by the First Amendment.").
121 See id.
122 For a discussion of the role that "public accommodations acts" ("PAAs") play in en-
forcing governmental anti-discrimination interests, see Lisa Gabrielle Lerman & Annette K.
Sanderson, Discrimination in Access to Public Places: A Survey of State and Federal Public
Accommodations Laws, 7 N.Y.U. REv. L. & SOC. CHANGE 215 (1978).
123 993 F.2d 1267 (7th Cir. 1993).124 See id, at 1268. The Boy Scout Oath states, in pertinent part: "On my honor, I will do
my best to do my duty to God... !'Id.
'
25 Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(a) (1988)).
.2 Entities that qualify as "place of public accommodations" for the purpose of Title IH
protection include: "[e]stablishments affecting interstate commerce or supported in their activi-
ties by State action as places of public accommodation; lodgings; ... places of exhibition or
entertainment; [and] other covered establishments." 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(b) (1988).
127 Welsh, 993 F.2d at 1269 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(b) (1988)).
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ticular facility. 128 An angry dissent blasted the majority's interpreta-
tion of Title II as "stingy and narrow."'
129
Stingy or not, this same approach was employed by the Supreme
Court of Kansas in Seabourn v. Coronado Area Council, Boy Scouts
of America130 in defining "public accommodations" as the term ap-
pears in the Kansas Act Against Discrimination ("KAAD"). In
Seabourn, the court upheld the BSA's rejection of an individual's
registration to serve as an adult leader on grounds that he was an
atheist.131 The court expressly rejected a "broad, expansive" defmi-
tion of "public accommodations" within the scope of the KAAD,
holding that any such definition "divorcing 'public accommodations'
from business establishment or business purpose.., is not the law in
Kansas."' 32 Thus, the BSA failed to qualify as a "public accommo-
dation" under this section because it "has no business purpose other
than maintaining the objectives and programs to which the operation
of facilities is merely incidental."' 33
In contrast to this narrow approach, a significant number of
courts dealing with the BSA have adopted a broader interpretation of
"public accommodations." Most recently, in Dale v. Boy Scouts of
America,134 a New Jersey appeals court expressly rejected the Welsh
mode of analysis. In Dale, the court was faced with the issue of
whether the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination's ("LAD") pro-
hibition on discrimination in "places of public accommodation"
barred the BSA from expelling an adult leader on grounds that he was
a practicing homosexual.135 After reviewing the Welsh/Seabourn ap-
proach, the court stated, "[w]e reject the narrow interpretation given
by Welsh to 'place of public accommodation' .... Applying Welsh's
view that Title II applies only to a 'place' would frustrate our goal of
eradicating 'the cancer of discrimination' in New Jersey."' 136 Under
this interpretation, the BSA qualifies as a "public accommodation"
and, therefore, is subject to the anti-discrimination requirements im-
posed by the LAD because it "invites the 'public at large'... [and]
offers accommodations which 'have many attributes in common
128 See id. But see Edward Bigham, Civil Rights-Seventh Circuit Permits Boy Scouts of
America to Exclude Atheist-Welsh v. Boy Scouts of America, 67 TEMP. L. REv. 1333, 1346-49
(1994) (criticizing the Welsh court's narrow interpretation of Title II's "place of public accom-
modation" language).
129 Welsh, 993 F.2d at 1279 (Cummings, J., dissenting).
130 891 P.2d 385 (Kan. 1995).
131 See id. at 406.
132 Id. (quoting KAN. STAT. ANN. § 44-1002(h) (1993)).
133 id.
134 706 A.2d 270 (N.J. Ct. App. 1998).
131 See id. at 274.
136 Id. at 279.
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with"' the activities deemed to be educational or recreational under
the LAD. 
137
In reviewing the applicability of New York's Human Rights Act
to the United African Movement, the City of New York Commission
on Human Rights recognized that the UAM's weekly meetings were
"'considered by many to be the premiere marketplace in this country
for the free exchange of African-centered ideas.' 13 8  As such, the
Commission stated that "[t]here is no dispute that UAM is an organi-
zation that is 'in its nature distinctly private,' ... and therefore not
subject to [the New York Act]., 139  Nevertheless, the Commission
found the UAM's weekly meetings to constitute a "public accommo-
dation' and thus to fall within the purview of the New York Act on
two grounds. First, UAM failed to exercise any exclusivity or selec-
tivity beyond a "skin test" in admitting individuals to its forums. 14°
These two "hallmarks of a 'distinctly private' event" dictate that or-
ganizations, to be exempted from the New York Act's defimition of
"public accommodation," must demonstrate that they are "organized
'solely for the benefit of its members. ,,141 Secondly, the UAM made
open invitations soliciting "the public's interest and participation in
the forums, without regard to UAM membership. Specifically, the
phrase 'Admission is free' [as used in sample UAM advertisement
examined by the Commission] implies that the forum is open to all
who wish to attend, without limitation."'142 In the words of the judge,
the UAM, "[Hbaving made [these] 'choices,' . . . [is] subject to the
provisions of the Code which prohibit race discrimination-regard-
less of the fact that they are organized by a 'distinctly private' organi-
zation and held on private property and paid for by private funds."143
By conditioning its holding on the public nature of the UAM's activ-
ity rather than its connection to any physical facility or its 'distinctly
137 Id. at 280, 282. Several other courts have adopted this expansive definition as well.
See, e.g., Quinnipiac Council, BSA v. Comm'n on Human Rights and Opportunities, 528 A.2d
352, 358 (Conn. 1987) (interpreting PAAs under Connecticut law to include "the discriminatory
conduct and not the discriminatory situs of an enterprise which offers its services to the general
public"); Curran v. Mount Diablo Council of the BSA, 147 Cal. App. 3d 712, 727-33 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1983) (interpreting the "all business establishments whatsoever" language of California's
Unruh Civil Rights Act to include the BSA), dismissed for want offinal judgment, 468 U.S.
1205 (1984). On remand, however, the California Supreme Court reversed course, holding that
the BSA was not a "business establishment" as defined by the Unruh Act. See Curran v. Mount
Diablo Council of the BSA, 952 P.2d 385 (Cal. 1998).
138 New York City Comm'n on Human Rights v. United African Movement, No.
MPA95-0851/PA95-0031, at 13 (N.Y.C.C.H.R. June 30, 1997) (recommended decision and
order) (citation omitted).
13 9 Id. at I 1 (citations omitted).
14 0 See id. at 13-14 ('This [skin] test demonstrates that admission was easy, and virtually
unrestricted, for anyone who was of African descent.").
141 Id. at 13 (quoting United States Power Squadrons v. State Human Rights App. Bd.,
452 N.E.2d 1199, 1204 (N.Y. 1983)).
142 Id. at 14.143 Id. at 17 (citation omitted).
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private' appearance, the Commission, like the Dale court, adopted an
expansive approach to New York City's PAA. In doing so, the
Commission subjected the UAM to the provisions of the New York
Act, thus putting at severe risk its race-based admission policies.
C. Compelling Governmental Interests
The Roberts test does not, however, dictate that "in every setting
in which individuals exercise some discrimination in choosing associ-
ates, their selective rocess of inclusion and exclusion is protected by
the Constitution." 14F In fact, the Supreme Court has made it very
clear that the freedom of expressive association, while a fundamental
constitutional right, is in no way absolute. 145 A court's finding that a
group's right to expressive association has clearly been infringed
upon by governmental action, or "harmed" as discussed above, does
not end judicial inquiry into the issue. Under the Roberts test, such
governmental "[i]nfringements . . . may be justified by regulations
adopted to serve compelling state interests, unrelated to the suppres-
sion of ideas, that cannot be achieved through means significantly less
restrictive of associational freedoms."' 46 In other words, any restric-
tive governmental action must be "narrowly tailored" to meet its ob-
jective. 147 Thus, upon a finding that a governmental action has im-
pinged upon an association's right to expressive association, a court is
left with two tasks. First, it must determine the extent to which the
interest of the state in taking such an action is "compelling." Sec-
ondly, it must then consider whether that interest is trumped by the
group's own interest in protecting its First Amendment rights.
1. Recognizing "Compelling" Interests
Associational rights may best be thought of as existing on a con-
tinuum ranging from "the least protected form of association ... to
144 New York State Club Ass'n v. City of New York, 487 U.S. 1, 13 (1988).
145 See Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 623 (1984) ("The right to associ-
ate for expressive purposes is not ... absolute."); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 25 (1976)
(stating that the right of association may be limited by state regulations necessary to serve a
compelling interest unrelated to the suppression of ideas).
146 Roberts, 468 U.S. at 623; see also Buckley, 424 U.S. at 25 ("Even a 'significant inter-
ference' with protected rights of political association may be sustained if the State demonstrates
a sufficiently important interest and employs means closely drawn to avoid unnecessary
abridgment of associational freedoms.") (citations omitted); Sanitation and Recycling Indus.,
Inc. v. City of New York, 107 F.3d 985, 997 (2d Cir. 1997) ("Even regulations that substantially
infringe upon [the right of expressive association] will pass constitutional muster if they serve
compelling government interests unrelated to the suppression of ideas and those interests cannot
be achieved through less restrictive means.").
147 See 4 ROTUNDA ET AL., supra note 53, § 20.41, at 250; see also Sanitation and Recy-
cling Indus., 107 F.3d at 997 ("'Precision of regulation must be the touchstone' in the First
Amendment context.") (quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415,438 (1963)).
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the most protected forms of association." 148 The factor distinguishing
the fights of groups located at different points along this spectrum is
the degree to which governmental infringement upon them must be
"compelling" in order to be deemed constitutional. For example, at
the "most protected" end of the continuum, we would likely find the
associational fights of groups formed for strictly political or expres-
sive purposes and those based on highly personal relationships.1  At
the opposite, or "least protected," end would be situated the associa-
tional fights of purely commercial groups. 50 To illustrate this idea,
imagine a large boycott: if held for political purposes, it "may receive
significant first amendment protection .... [while if organized] for the
purposes of maintaining a preferred economic position for one's busi-
ness or union," the demonstration is likely to receive very little pro-
tection.151 Thus, a court's evaluation of the nature of the associational
freedom determines how much deference should be given to the com-
peting governmental interest.152 While no strict guidelines have been
set as to what criteria should be employed in determining whether a
state interest is "compelling," the judiciary has recognized a variety of
such interests, ranging from "[m]aintaining a stable political sys-
tem '' 53 to "combatting [sic] crime, corruption and racketeering." M
2. Identifying a Standard of Review
Once an interest has been deemed "compelling," courts are split
on the standard to be applied in determining whether the governmen-
tal action at issue is "narrowly tailored." A majority of courts and
commentators have characterized the Roberts holding as a "balancing
148 4 ROTUNDA ET AL, supra note 53, § 20.41, at 254; see also Elks Lodges No. 719
(Ogden) and No. 2021 (Moab) v. Dep't of Alcoholic Beverage Control, 905 P.2d 1189, 1195
(Utah 1995) ("[Ihe history of First Amendment jurisprudence regarding the right of free asso-
ciation indicates first that... it is... a right which exists on a continuum of protection.").
149 See 4 ROTUNDA ET AL., supra note 53, § 20.41, at 254.
150 See id.
151 Id. at 254-55. Compare NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886 (1982)
(holding that boycott of stores organized to influence government policy constituted activity
protected by the First Amendment), with NLRB v. Retail Store Employees Union, Local 1001,
447 U.S. 607 (1980) (prohibiting labor picket line advocating boycott of secondary employer).
152See 4 ROTUNDA ET AL, supra note 53, § 20.41, at 250.
153 Eu v. San Francisco County Democratic Cent. Comm., 489 U.S. 214, 226 (1989). In
Eu, the Court recognized as compelling state interests the "fostering an informed electorate" as
well as "preserving the integrity of its election process." Id. at 228, 231; see also Tashjian v.
Republican Party, 479 U.S. 208, 217 (1986) (holding that stated governmental interests---"en-
suring the administrability of the primary system, preventing raiding, avoiding voter confusion,
and protecting the responsibility of party govermment"--were not sufficiently substantial);
Democratic Party v. Wisconsin ex reL LaFolette, 450 U.S. 107, 124-25 (1981) (holding that
state interests in "preserving the overall integrity of the electoral process, providing secrecy of
the ballot, increasing voter participation in primaries, and preventing harassment of voters" did
not justify infringements upon political party's associational freedoms).
15 4 Sanitation and Recycling Indus., Inc. v. City of New York, 107 F.3d 985, 998 (2d Cir.
1997).
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of interests" test.115 The first step employed in this approach is to ex-
amine the extent to which the governmental action at issue actually
infringes upon, or causes "actual harm" to, the group's freedom of
expressive association.156 Next, a court will assess the "value" of the
group's First Amendment claims. 157 Finally, with the two competing
interests identified and evaluated, a court will weigh those interests
against one another with an eye toward the question of whether there
are any comparable means by which the governmental interest may
be met without injuring the group's associational freedoms.
Typical of this type of analysis is the district court's reasoning in
South Boston Allied War Veterans Council v. City of Boston.'58 There,
the court ruled that the issuance of a parade permit, conditioned upon
allowing the Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of
Boston ("GLIB") to participate, unconstitutionally infringed upon the
associational rights of the veterans group seeking the permit. The
city's interest behind the permit rule, the eradication of discrimination
against homosexuals, was recognized as both valid and compelling.
59
One of parade's organizing themes, however, was a protest of judicial
decrees forcing the veterans to include the homosexual association in
its 1993 parade.16° Thus, the burden on the veterans' associational
155 See, e.g., Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 632 (1984) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring) (characterizing the majority holding as a "balancing-of-interests test"); Invisible
Empire of the Knights of the KKK v. Mayor of Thurmont, 700 F. Supp. 281, 289 (D. Md. 1988)
(stating that the Supreme Court has engaged in "a balancing analysis in examining the various
rights involved" in expressive association cases); Elks Lodges No. 719 (Ogden) and No. 2021
(Moab) v. Dep't of Alcoholic Beverage Control, 905 P.2d 1189, 1197-98 (Utah 1995) (weighing
interests at issue in compliance with the Roberts test); Deborah L. Rhode, Association and As-
similation, 81 Nw. U. L. REV. 106, 116 (1986) (interpreting Roberts as prescribing a balancing
test); Marshall, supra note 78, at 72 ('The Roberts Court employed a balancing test in reaching
its decision.").
156 See South Boston Allied Veterans Council v. City of Boston, 875 F. Supp. 891, 914-
15 (D. Mass. 1995).
'57 See id. at 915-16. The South Boston court, however, placed a disclaimer on its use of
the word "value": "It should be clearly recognized, however, that "the balancing of interests test
... does not require or permit the court to assess the validity or value of the views the Veterans
seek to express." Id. at 913.
'5' 875 F. Supp. 891 (D. Mass. 1995).
159 See id. at 914 ("The Massachusetts statute .... 'plainly serves compelling state inter-
ests of the highest order."') (quoting Roberts, 468 U.S. at 624).
160 See id. at 894-95. The procedural history of the GLIB's struggle for inclusion in the
veterans' St. Patrick's Day parade is complex. In short, the GLIB applied and was denied a
permit to march in the 1993 parade. The GLIB filed suit against the veterans, claiming that the
veterans had violated the state's anti-discrimination law. The GLIB's original claim was finally
resolved by the Supreme Court's ruling in Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual
Group of Boston, 515 U.S. 557 (1995). The Hurley decision reversed the Massachusetts' high
court's ruling in its holding that the City of Boston had violated the veterans' First Amendment
rights by requiring the inclusion of the GLIB in the 1993 parade. In the intervening years, how-
ever, the veterans, based on the state court's ruling, decided to cancel the 1994 parade rather
than allow the GLIB to march under the then-unreviewed state court rulings in favor of the
GLIB. The 1995 parade, which took place three months before the Supreme Court issued its
Hurley decision, was organized with both a traditional theme of community celebration and a
theme unique to that year's parade: protest of the state courts' pro-GLIB rulings with respect to
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rights would have been substantial if inclusion was enforced in 1995,
while the effect on the GLIB of not being allowed to march, although
genuine, would be minimal.16' The court, however, did not end its
inquiry there. In weighing the two interests, the court found that the
GLB had an alternative means of achieving its goals through a sec-
ond parade organized by its group. 62 Therefore, under a "balancing
of interests" test, compelled inclusion of the GLIB in the veterans'
1995 parade was deemed to be an unconstitutional infringement on
the First Amendment rights of the veterans.
On the other hand, a significant minority of courts and com-
mentators interpret the Roberts holding as dictating a "strict scrutiny"
standard. 63 Use of the term "strict scrutiny" as the means of analyz-
ing governmental infringements on the freedom of expressive asso-
ciation springs from the Roberts progeny's recognition that such a
freedom is "fundamental."'164 Upon examination, however, the differ-
ence between these two modes of analysis seems to be little more
than semantics. The strict scrutiny test, as applied in the context of
expressive association, places the burden of proof on the government
to demonstrate that "(1) the state action serves a compelling state in-
terest which (2) cannot be achieved through means significantly less
restrictive of one's associational freedom."' 165 While courts may em-
ploy differing terms of art in describing their analysis, the legal con-
sequences are the same: once a governmental action has been deemed
to substantially burden a group's First Amendment right to associa-
tion, that action will be deemed constitutional only if the action is
shown to serve a compelling governmental interest which can not be
met by a less restrictive means. At least one commentator has seen
these two tests as different incantations of the same analysis, de-
scribing the method used as "structured balancing-the well known
the 1993 parade. For the 1995 parade, the veterans sought to compel the City of Boston to issue
them a parade permit that was not conditional upon the GLIB's inclusion. The ruling concern-
ing this 1995 permit is contained in South Boston.
161 See South Boston, 875 F. Supp. at 916.
162 See id. at 916-17.
163 See Salvation Army v. Dep't of Community Affairs, 919 F.2d 183,200 (3d Cir. 1990)
("The Roberts opinion teaches that strict scrutiny is to be applied to infringements on the free-
dom of association for free speech purposes .... "); Korenyi v. Dep't of Sanitation, 699 F. Supp.
388, 394 (E.D.N.Y. 1988) (stating that Supreme Court "has engaged in strict scrutiny" in re-
viewing state actions that may implicate a group's right to associate for expressive purposes).
164 See, e.g., Tashjian v. Republican Party, 479 U.S. 208, 214-16 (1986) (holding that
state's "closed-primary" statute interfered with a political party's First Amendment right to
define its associational boundaries); Louisiana Debating and Literary Ass'n v. City of New
Orleans, 42 F.3d 1483, 1498 (5th Cir. 1995) (invalidating an ordinance prohibiting discrimina-
tion in places of public accommodations on the ground that private clubs are entitled to the
fullest protection of associational rights under the First Amendment).
165 Louisiana Debating and Literary Ass'n, 42 F.3d at 1498 (citations omitted).
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'strict scrutiny' test.' 166 For its part, the Supreme Court has never
employed either of these two terms of art to describe its analysis of
associational freedom issues. 167
In the case of the UAM, the Commission interpreted the Roberts
framework as requiring a "balancing test" analysis. On Southgate's
end of the scale, the judge ruled that "the interest of New York City in
eradicating race discrimination unquestionably serves a compelling
state interest.' 168 Furthermore, the Commission ruled that the em-
bodiment of that interest, the New York City Human Rights Act, did
not aim at the suppression of the organization's First Amendment
right to free speech. 169 On the side of UAM, the Commission ex-
pressly recognized a "nexus between [the UAM's] racially discrimi-
natory membership policies and the group's message that Caucasians
and people of African descent should not mix." As a "private
membership organization," the judge found that "[i]mposing the
Code's anti-discrimination provisions would dilute the message
which they advocate."'17' Despite this finding, however, the Commis-
sion held that application of the New York Act to the UAM would not
unconstitutionally trample its First Amendment rights because South-
gate did not seek to force integration of the UAM, but rather merely
sought to compel the group to either suspend advertising for its
meetings or attach a disclaimer to such ads notifying the public that
its meetings are open only to UAM members. 72 Through its adver-
tising of the Cornel West lecture, the UAM, in the Commission's
words, took on a "public nature" which subjected it "to certain legal
obligations. 1,, 73 The Commission did, however, recognize that a dif-
ferent result may have been in order had Southgate sought to compel
the inclusion of whites: "This tribunal would concur with [the
UAM's] argument of a constitutional violation if the relief sought by
the Bureau required that UAM either admit Caucasians to its forums,
or cease to organize its weekly events."'174 In light of such a request
by Southgate, however, "[a]ny other solution would disturb the legal
166 Buss, supra note 104, at 845 (describing this method of analysis as one "under which
fundamental individual interests are subject to restriction on the basis of a compelling state
interest furthered in the least restrictive manner").
167 See, e.g., Eu v. San Francisco County Democratic Cent. Comm., 489 U.S. 214, 225
(1989) ("Because the ban burdens appellees' rights to free speech and free association, it can
only survive constitutional scrutiny if it serves a compelling governmental interest.").
168 New York City Comm'n on Human Rights v. United African Movement, No.
MPA95-0851/PA95-0031, at 29 (N.Y.C.C.H.R. June 30, 1997) (recommended decision and
order). 169 See id.
170 Id. at 30.
171 Id.
172 See id. at 28-29.
171 Id. at 30.
'74 Id. at 28-29.
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equilibrium between [the UAM's] associational rights and the City's
interest."
175
Ill. DIFFERING INTERESTS: RACE-BASED ORGANIZATIONS & ANTI-
DISCRIMINATION LAWS
A. The Right to Discriminate & Private Clubs
The societal push towards eradicating discrimination has resulted
in the passage of numerous PAAs by states. While "the Constitution
does not directly prohibit discrimination by those who are not state
actors,"1 76 state law has sought to fill the gap 77 through the use of
these PAAs, specifically by prohibiting discrimination in public ac-
commodations such as housing and education. 178 These statutes were
enacted for the purpose of "protecting the civil rights of historically
disadvantaged groups ....
,r79
As stated by the Roberts Court, "acts of invidious discrimination
in the distribution of publicly available goods, services and other ad-
vantages cause unique evils that government has a compelling interest
to prevent .... ."" Under this interpretation of the states' role in the
fight against discrimination, courts have almost unanimously found
that the governmental interest in eradicating discrimination against
historically disadvantaged groups in public accommodations to be
very compelling.181 This judicial resistance against disparaging a
'75 Id. at 30.
176 Marshall, supra note 78, at 68 (citations omitted).
'n The basic federal guarantee of equal access to public accommodations comes in Title
II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. However, Title I1 "does not touch significant areas of dis-
crimination in public accommodations," hence the need for state PAAs. See Lerman & Sander-
son, supra note 122, at 219.
See Marshall, supra note 78, at 68.
179 Ann M. Overbeck, Case Note, 53 U. CIN. L. REV. 1173, 1178 (1984); see also Roberts
v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 625-26 (1984) ("Like many States and municipalities,
Minnesota has adopted a functional definition of public accommodations that reaches various
forms of public, quasi-commercial conduct. This expansive definition reflects a recognition of
the changing nature of the American economy and of the importance, both the individual and to
society, of removing the barriers to economic advancement and political and social integration
that have historically plagued certain disadvantaged groups, including women.") (citations
omitted).
SO Roberts, 468 U.S. at 628.
181 See Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston, 515 U.S.
557, 572 (1995) ("Provisions like [Massachusetts' anti-discrimination law] are well within the
State's usual power to enact when a legislature has reason to believe that a given group is the
target of discrimination, and they do not, as a general matter, violate the First or Fourteenth
Amendments."); New York State Club Ass'n v. City of New York, 487 U.S. 1, 14 n.5 (1988)
("[l]t is relevant to note that the Court has recognized the State's 'compelling interest' in com-
bating invidious discrimination."); Board of Dirs. of Rotary Int'l v. Rotary Club, 481 U.S. 537,
549 (1987) (recognizing "the State's compelling interest in eliminating discrimination against
women"); Roberts, 468 U.S. at 624 (finding that the Minnesota Human Rights Act aimed at the
eradication of discrimination "plainly serves compelling state interests of the highest order");
South Boston Allied War Veterans Council v. City of Boston, 875 F. Supp. 891, 914 (D. Mass.
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state's anti-discrimination goals has held true even in cases where
some degree of infringement on the group's associational freedoms
has occurred, regardless of whether the Court employed a "balancing"
or "strict scrutiny" review of the governmental interest.182 In its re-
view of the effects a non-discrimination law would have on an all-
male organization, the Supreme Court in Board of Directors of Rotary
International v. Rotary Club183 stated that "[e]ven if the Unruh Act
does work some slight infringement on Rotary members', right of ex-
pressive association, that infringement is justified because it serves
the State's compelling interest in eliminating discrimination against
women."' 184 The judiciary's reluctance to rule against an anti-
discrimination interest in favor of private organizations has led some
commentators to argue that the Supreme Court has in fact established
a "rebuttable presumption" in favor of such state interests.'85
One of the most troubling issues faced by courts in the last two
decades has been the treatment of private clubs that maintain dis-
criminatory admission policies. Therein lies, as Lawrence Tribe
noted, "'the ancient paradox of liberalism"': the conflict between
freedom and equality.186 On one hand, the governmental interest in
eradicating discrimination holds great weight in American courts. On
the other hand, the associational rights of "private" clubs 187 warrant
substantial constitutional protection under the First Amendment. This
intersection of freedoms was the issue faced by the Supreme Court in
Roberts: a private club which accepted only men as full-fledged
members sought to prevent the application of Minnesota's PAA (the
"Minnesota Act"), which prohibited discrimination based on factors
1995) ("The Massachusetts statute prohibiting discrimination in public accommodations...
'reflects the [Commonwealth's] strong historical commitment to eliminating discrimination and
assuring its citizens equal access to publicly available goods and services. That goal... plainly
serves compelling state interests ....') (quoting Roberts, 468 U.S. at 624).
182 See, e.g., Roberts, 468 U.S. at 628 ("[E]ven if enforcement of the [Human Rights] Act
causes some incidental abridgment of the Jaycees' protected speech, that effect is no greater
than is necessary to accomplish the State's legitimate purposes."); Elks Lodges No. 719 (Ogden)
and No. 2021 (Moab) v. Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control, 905 P.2d 1189, 1195 (Utah
1995) ("[T]he state interest in prohibiting gender-based discrimination outweighs whatever
associational interest, if any, the Elks or the Moose may have in maintaining state-licensed
liquor clubs.") (citation omitted).
183 481 U.S. 537 (1987).
184 Id. at 549 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
18s See Buss, supra note 104, at 847-48 (arguing that "[Roberts] and its progeny may
foreshadow an absolute rule in upholding the antidiscrimination interest").
186 See Marshall, supra note 78, at 69 (describing this "inherent conflict" as "one of the
most problematic areas in constitutional law") (citation omitted); see also Buss, supra note 104,
at 845 ("[A] private club may have a very strong constitutional claim of right to expressive
association in precisely the same situation in which the state has a very strong justification to
protect excluded individuals from commercial disadvantage. Thus, the collision forces a choice
between two values that are comparable in magnitude but different in kind.").
187 Private clubs are defined as "organizations not providing direct services to the general
public." Marshall, supra note 78, at 68.
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including race and gender.18 The Court recognized as compelling the
government's interest in "eradicating discrimination."'189 Justifying
its conclusion that any infringement on the Jaycees by the Minnesota
Act was trumped by Minnesota's interest, the Court stated:
[A]cts of invidious discrimination in the distribution of
publicly available goods, services, and other advantages
cause unique evils that government has a compelling inter-
est to prevent-wholly apart from the point of view such
conduct may transmit. Accordingly, like violence or other
types of potentially expressive activities that produce spe-
cial harms distinct from their communicative impact, such
practices are entitled to no constitutional protection ....
[T]he Minnesota Act therefore 'responds precisely to the
substantive problem which legitimately concerns' the State
and abridges no more speech or associational freedom than
is necessary to accomplish that purpose. 190,
B. Justifying Race-Based Organizations
On its face, the standard set forth by the Supreme Court would
seem to close the door to the possibility of racially discriminatory
organizations such as the UAM. But a careful reading of the Roberts
holding makes clear that the state's anti-discrimination interest pre-
vailed not due to any absolute rule in favor of such an interest, but
more likely because the Court, in weighing the conflicting interests,
found "virtually nothing on the Jaycees' side of the scale" to counter-
balance the state's interest.19' Fatal to its claim was the Jaycees' in-
ability to demonstrate how the inclusion of women would "impose[]
any serious burdens on the male members' freedom of expressive as-
sociation."' 2 In other words, the Jaycees were unable to rebut the
Court's presumption in favor of the state's anti-discrimination inter-
est.
193
Just as it has detailed the weight to be given to the interest be-
hind PAAs, the Court has also made it clear that the compelling na-
ture of that interest does not totally override an organization's right to
exclude certain individuals. Similar to the situation in Roberts, the
18s See Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 612-17 (1984).
'
9 Id. at 623.
190 Ma at 628-29 (citations omitted).
191 See Buss, supra note 104, at 849.
.
92 Roberts, 468 U.S. at 626.
193 See Buss, supra note 104, at 848-50; see also supra notes 90-115 and accompanying
text (describing the evidentiary standard to be met by any group seeking protecting of its asso-
ciational freedom).
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Court in New York State Club Ass'n v. City of New York194 was faced
with the issue of private clubs that employ discriminatory policies.
The New York State Club Court took the opportunity not only to reaf-
firm its holding in Roberts, but also to explicate the impact of that
holding on an organization's right to discriminate. According to the
Court:
[i]f a club seeks to exclude individuals who do not share the
views that the club's members wish to promote, the Law
erects no obstacle to this end. Instead, the Law merely pre-
vents an association from using race, sex, and other specified
characteristics as shorthand measures in place of what the
city considers to be more legitimate criteria for determining
membership.1 95
In accordance with this holding, a state has a valid interest, ex-
pressed by way of its public accommodations law, which would allow
for infringement on a group's associational freedom. However, on the
flip side of that broad grant of power, an organization is still free to
some extent to exercise its right to dissociate from certain individuals.
The Court, however, has never delineated the threshold point at
which an organization's protection ends and the state's power to
regulate begins. It seems clear, nonetheless, from the language of
New York State Club, that any such discriminatory policy must be
based on the message of the organization itself, rather than merely as
a means of furthering, without cause, the systematic and prejudicial
exclusion of members of historically disadvantaged groups.
In light of any guidance from the Supreme Court delineating the
extent of these two valid competing interests, discriminatory policies
against historically disadvantaged groups in private clubs would seem
to be constitutionally valid on at least two grounds.
1. The Message and the Messenger Intertwined
First, the PAAs at issue in the Roberts trilogy were directed at
associations in which commercial activity occurred. 196 The goal un-
derlying the PAAs was "to provide equal opportunity to minorities
and women to participate in the business life of the community and to
194 487 U.S. 1 (1988).
19 5 Id. at 13.
196 See Invisible Empire of the Knights of the KKK v. Mayor of Thurmont, 700 F. Supp.
281, 289 (D. Md. 1988); see also Roberts, 468 U.S. at 626 ("[Inn explaining its conclusion that
the Jaycees local chapters are 'place[s] of public accommodations' . . ., the Minnesota court
noted the various commercial programs and benefits offered to members and stated that
'[l]eadership skills are "goods," [and] business contacts and employment promotions are
"privileges" and "advantages"....' Assuring women equal access to such goods, privileges,
and advantages clearly furthers compelling state interests.") (citation omitted).
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expose them to the business contacts and activity which often occur at
discriminatory clubs." 197 Those state laws had minimal impact on the
message and First Amendment rights of the complaining organiza-
tions. A distinction can be drawn between such commercially ori-
ented groups upon which enforcement of a PAA has little or no effect,
and those groups formed for, or actively engaged in, the communica-
tion of ideas. As to this latter set of organizations, the general princi-
ples outlined within the Roberts analysis are applicable, but its hold-
ing is inapposite. As one court has stated, "[The Roberts cases] do not
stand for the proposition that the state may require noncommercial
expressive associations to allow minorities to participate in expressive
group activities."
198
The Supreme Court has expressly recognized the difference be-
tween such "commercial" and "expressive" associations. In its New
York State Club decision, 99 the Court stated:
It is conceivable, of course, that an association might be able
to show that it is organized for specific expressive purposes
and that it will not be able to advocate its desired viewpoints
nearly as effectively if it cannot confine its membership to
those who share the same sex, for example, or the same re-
ligion.2
00
Forcing a group which has staked its very existence on its racial,
sexual or political makeup to include individuals who represent a
view or stance in direct opposition to that of the organization works to
both distort the group's message and to dissuade others from associ-
ating themselves with the group.201 As stated by the Roberts Court:
There can be no clearer example of an [unconstitutional] in-
trusion into the internal structure or affairs of an association
than a regulation that forces the group to accept members it
does not desire. Such a regulation may impair the ability of
the original members to express only those views that
brought them together.
202
To illustrate the potential effect of a PAA on an expressive
group, Professor Sally Frank gives the example of a "men's rights
organization which bars women because it was formed to give men an
opportunity to discuss ways in which men are disadvantaged as
'9' Invisible Empire of the Knights of the KKK, 700 F. Supp. at 289.
19s Id.
'99 487 U.S. 1 (1988).
"0°Id. at 13.
201 See supra notes 100-06 and accompanying text.
2 Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 623 (1984) (emphasis added).
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males, and then to work to overcome those disadvantages." 203 Under
Frank's analysis, such a group would be afforded constitutional pro-
tection based on the close nexus between its expressed purpose and its
bar on women.2 04 Similar protection would thus be available to
groups who are organized around a race-based platform, such as a
"campus African-American group" or "a Ku Klux Klan chapter., 20 5
As pointed out by Professor Frank, granting protection to such
groups often compels the attitude expressed in the phrase, "I disap-
prove of what you say, but I will defend to the death your right to say
it."2 6 In contrast, the discriminatory policies of groups organized for
purely commercial or social reasons, e.g., a "women's breakfast
club," 2 7 lack the necessary connection to a First Amendment activity
to receive constitutional protection. In other words, racial discrimi-
nation as organizational policy practiced by a purely expressive asso-
ciation would rank on the "more protected" end of the associational
freedom continuum, whereas the same policy implemented by a
commercial group would be placed towards the "less protected" end,
thereby making it subject to more governmental infringement. 2°8 In
essence, the message communicated by an "expressive" group by way
of its discriminatory policies is indistinguishable from the group it-
self.
The Supreme Court has not yet had the opportunity to review the
applicability of a non-discrimination law to a purely expressive, ra-
cially exclusive group, such as the UAM. 2°9 However, the majority of
commentators and the few courts who have dealt with the issue have
upheld the organization's right to discriminate in the face of a valid
PAA.210 In Invisible Empire of the Knights of the Ku Klux Klan v.
Mayor of Thurmont,211 the Ku Klux Klan ("KKK") applied for a per-
mit to parade on a city's streets for the purpose of recruiting new
203 Sally Frank, The Key to Unlocking the Clubhouse Door: The Application of Antidis-
crimination Laws to Quasi-Private Clubs, 2 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 27, 60 (1994).
204 See id.
205 Id.206 Id. at 61 (attributed to Voltaire) (citation omitted).
2w Id. at60.
208 See supra notes 148-52 and accompanying text (discussing the continuum of associa-
tional rights).
209 See Frank, supra note 203, at 59 ("The Supreme Court has not yet decided a case in
which a quasi-private club was sued for discrimination and was able to establish a genuine
connection between its discrimination and its expressive activities. When such a case arises, the
organization's freedom of expressive association claims will be much harder to reject").
210 See Buss, supra note 104, at 848 ("[C]Iubs can rebut the presumption in favor of the
state's compelling antidiscrimination interest by either an actual evidentiary showing ... that
the excluded group has a discrete, identifiable and different position on some issue of concern to
the club ...."; see also Frank, supra note 203, at 60 ("Organizations formed to advance gen-
der- or race-based interests might successfully withstand legal challenge by linking membership
discrimination to their political goals.").
211 700 F. Supp. 281 (D. Md. 1988).
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members and showing the group's support of the "Just Say No to
Drugs" program. 212 The town, which had no codified procedure for
granting such permits, denied both the KKK's initial application and
its subsequent request for a permit based on the group's racially dis-
criminatory policies. 2 3 The court was faced with the issue of
"whether the Town [could] constitutionally impose a nondiscrimina-
tion condition on the KKK parade., 214 While recognizing Roberts as
providing the proper standard of review in associational freedom
claims, the court seized upon the language of New York State Club
discussing purely expressive clubs.215 As interpreted by this court,
the proper analysis prescribed by the Roberts trilogy requires an ex-
amination of "the connection between membership and the mes-
sage. 2
16
The KKK, as described by the court, is a group "organized for
specific expressive purposes" that "desires to convince others of the
need for segregation of the races and to send the message of white
supremacy." 2 17 Forcing such a group to allow minorities to march
with them would "destroy" and "change the primary message which
the KKK advocates. 2 8 In short, they would be made to be hypo-
crites.219 With reference to the other side of the balancing scale, the
court stated:
The Town's interest here ... is somewhat less compelling
than the states' interests in the club cases. Black and non-
gentile persons here are not being denied the opportunity to
gain business contacts and skills. They are merely being de-
nied the right to march in a private group's parade. This is
entirely proper .... 220
Recognizing that "[i]f ever there was a case where the member-
ship and the message were coextensive, it is here," the Invisible Em-
212 See id. at 282.
213 See id. at 282-83. The town also justified its denial on grounds that the KKK had not
been forthcoming with information about the actual group to which the town was issuing the
permit and the KKK's refisal to provide insurance for the event. See id. at 283-84.214 Id. at 286. The Thurmont Board of Commissioners, which scheduled a public hearing
on the matter, overturned the town's second denial of the KKK's request. See id. at 283. At
sometime before this meeting, the NAACP threatened to sue the town if it granted the permit
without imposing a nondiscrimination condition. See id. At the meeting, the Board voted to
deny permission to the KKK. See id. at 283-84.
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pire court held that the nondiscrimination clause would work an un-
constitutional infringement on the associational rights of the KKKY 1
The UAM "is a private membership organization established for
the purpose of engaging in the expressive activity of espousing Pan-
African views." 22  First Amendment activities undertaken by the
UAM, in the form of weekly forums are directly focused on the fur-
thering of Pan-African ideals.2 3 The group's bar on the admission of
whites constitutes a means by which the group strives to further its
message. Accordingly, the City of New York Human Rights Com-
mission expressly recognized the "nexus between [the UAM's] ra-
cially discriminatory membership policies and the group's message
that Caucasians and people of African descent should not mix .... In
sum, race bears upon the views the group espouses. '2 24 Under the
described analysis, the existence of such a "nexus" between the
group's exclusionary policies and its First Amendment activities dic-
tates that the forced inclusion of whites would serve to distort and
mute the group's symbolic message. The UAM, like the KKK in In-
visible Empire, would be made to be "hypocrites." Thus, the
UAM's racially discriminatory policies must be protected against
governmental anti-discrimination acts as a constitutional exercise of
the group's expressive association.
2. The Right of "Cultural Association"
A second haven of constitutional protection for racially discrimi-
natory groups may be found in the notion of "cultural association."
According to William Marshall, the question to be addressed in deal-
ing with such clubs under this argument is not whether the associa-
tional rights of members have been violated by a governmental in-
fringement. Rather, the true issues at play are whether an interest ex-
ists in favor of a subgroup of society to form their own organization
and whether that interest is of such a compelling nature as to justify
the club's discriminatory policies in the face of state anti-discrim-
ination laws.226 Such a "right of cultural association" would not de-
pend on a group's status as commercial or expressive, or on the des-
ignation of its association as intimate or expressive, but rather upon a
221 See id.
222 New York City Comm'n on Human Rights v. United African Movement, No.
MPA95-0851/PA95-0031, at 30 (N.Y.C.C.H.R. June 30, 1997) (recommended decision and
order).
223 See discussion supra Part I(A).
224 See New York City Comm'n on Human Rights v. United African Movement, No.
MPA95-0851/PA95-0031, at 30 (N.Y.C.C.H.R. June 30, 1997) (recommended decision and
order).
22- See Invisible Empire of the Knights of the KKK, 700 F.Supp. at 289.
226 See Marshall, supra note 78, at 84.
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clearly identifiable interest "in associating to preserve national and
religious identities and communities."227 Unlike the protection out-
lined in New York State Club and Invisible Empire, a group seeking
constitutional haven for discriminatory policies under a right of cul-
tural association would not bear the burden of proving a connection
between such policies and its First Amendment activities. Rather,
such an organization would be required only to demonstrate that it
was built around its members' cultural values, arguably a lesser bur-
den.Y For example, in Roberts, this theory would allow for the ex-
istence of a bar on membership to women because men, as the or-
ganizers of the Jaycees, hold a constitutional right to associate as
men, regardless of whether the group's principal functions are dis-
tinctively "male." Unfortunately for this discussion, the Supreme
Court has never directly addressed this issue. 99
Arguments in favor of recognizing such a right to cultural asso-
ciation rest on three constitutionally significant ideals: self-identity,
communitarianism and pluralism. First, according to Marshall,
constitutional protection is warranted for such groups "because of the
'crucial' role cultural affiliation plays in forming self-identity."' 1
The importance of the relationship between cultural affinity and self-
identification is employed to "analogize cultural association to the
constitutionally protected associational rights within families .....
[which] represent 'primordial' aspects of self.''232 Thus, exclusion of
certain groups based on cultural affinity rather than on purely capri-
cious choice is of the same constitutional import as the bonds between
an individual and the "primordial," thus warranting constitutional
protection. 3  Under this theory, it is the "preservation of the essential
elements of self, not of freedom of choice" which forms the basis of
this protection. 2m Communitarianism, the second basis for Marshall's
2 Id at 84-85.
228 According to Marshall, this is the biggest failing point in recognizing the right to cul-
tural association. Granting constitutional license to the discriminatory actions of any group
merely because it draws its boundaries along cultural lines raises two problems. First, what
criteria are appropriate in determining whether a country club, for example, is Irish or African-
American? See id. at 90-9 1. Second, even if such a determination can be made, should an "Irish
country club" be granted constitutional protection based on its cultural identity where its princi-
pal activities are in no way related to such identity, e.g., tennis or golf? See id. In the absence of
Supreme Court precedent resolving these questions, Marshall suggests that to avoid these prob-
lems, any standard for "cultural protection" should closely parallel the test employed in analyz-
ing expressive association. That is, the organization should have to demonstrate a clear connec-
tion between its cultural identity and its discriminatory policies. See id.
229 According to Marshall, this is the case because such groups are traditionally exempted
from state anti-discrimination legislation. See id.
230 See id. at 86-87.
231 Id. at 86 (quoting Kenneth L. Karst, Paths to Belonging: The Constitution and Cul-
tural Identity, 64 N.C. L. REv. 303, 308 (1986)).
232id.
233 See id. at 86-87.
2m Id. at 87.
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theory, views societal subgroups as "buffers against the expansion of
governmental power. ' '235 Marshall argues that the Roberts Court ex-
plicitly recognized the promotion of "cultural diversity" as a valid
basis for protecting expressive association.2 6  Finally, pluralism
stresses "the value of preserving cultural entities... as an end in it-
self.' ' 2 7 According to Marshall, pluralism is recognized as a basis for
expressive association because it "allows the development and ad-
vancement of diverse perspectives and thereby enhances the national
debate."238
As noted previously, the City of New York Commission on Hu-
man Rights ruled that the UAM "is a private membership organiza-
tion established for the purpose of engaging in the expressive activity
of espousing Pan-Africanist views." 39 Under the analysis proposed
by Marshall, the UAM's discriminatory policies warrant constitu-
tional protection because the group embodies the three ideals envel-
oped within the "right to cultural association." First, the principle
driving the formation of the UAM, "removing from all persons of
African ancestry all badges of slavery and all vestiges of colonial-
ism,''4° is necessarily a function of self-identity for its African-
American members. Just as a family unit provides shelter for its
members, the UAM offers its members "a 'sanctuary' from racism"
for its members. 241 This communal sense of refuge from society's
racial bias and hatred is a "primary bond" which serves to tie together
the many individuals who make up the UAM's body politic. The
UAM, as a group of black individuals, is, in the words of Owen Fiss,
"'viewed as a group; [who] view themselves as a group; [and whose]
identity is in large part determined by membership in the group
.... ,,242 Secondly, under the rubric of communitarianism, the UAM
as mentioned above acts as "sanctuary" for African-Americans
against the discrimination they endure at the hands of the white ma-
jority. In turn, such sanctuary provides the African-American com-
munity with a forum to express "Pan-African" ideals, values that fre-
quently are viewed by society in general with fear and suspicion. In
235 id.
236 See id. The Supreme Court has stated that the protection of "[associational rights are]
especially important in preserving political and cultural diversity and in shielding dissident
expression from suppression by the majority." Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609,
622 (1984).
237 Marshall, supra note 78, at 88.
238 Id.
239 New York City Comm'n on Human Rights v. United African Movement, No.
MPA95-0851/PA95-0031, at 30 (N.Y.C.C.H.R. June 30, 1997) (recommended decision and
order).24 Id. at4.
241 See id.
242 Owen Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, 5 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 107, 148
(1976), quoted in Marshall, supra note 78, at 86.
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other words, the UAM "foster[s] diversity and act[s] as [a] critical
buffer between [its members] and the power of the State.'" 243 Finally,
the weekly forums and demonstrations sponsored by the UAM serve
to make the voice of black nationalism heard in the national debate
over racial issues. In so doing, the UAM "enrich[es] the national
culture,"'244 thus embracing the notion of pluralism. Therefore, be-
cause the UAM embodies the ideals of self-identity, communitarian-
ism, and pluralism, its activities merit constitutional protection under
the "right to cultural association."
IV. BLACK AND WHITE INTERESTS: A ROBERTS COMPARISON
A. An Organization's Right of Expressive Association
As previously discussed, the policy driving states to enact PAAs
was the elimination of discrimination against historically disadvan-
taged groups.245 In fact, such laws "provided the primary means for
protecting the civil rights of historically disadvantaged groups until
the Federal Government reentered the field" with the passage of the
Civil Rights Act, a comprehensive body of law intended to sound the
death knell for the nation's Jim Crow era of racial segregation.
246
Today, these PAAs continue to play an essential role in filling the
gaps left in federal anti-discrimination legislation. 247 Given this
background, it is not surprising that the overwhelming majority of
lawsuits brought to enforce such laws have been brought by minority
groups attempting to force open the doors of discriminatory organiza-
tions. Judicial decisions in these cases have been premised on the
understanding that PAAs are instruments with which to protect Afri-
can-Americans and other minorities from racial discrimination. 4
No matter how clear their legislative intent may seem upon in-
vestigation, the majority of state PAAs still are race-neutral on their
face, prohibiting all discrimination based on race.249 Until the last
few decades, this was an acceptable approach because the vast major-
23 Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 619 (1984) (citations omitted).
244 Marshall, supra note 78, at 88.
245 See supra notes 177-85 and accompanying text (describing the role of PAAs in eradi-
cating discrimination).
2 6 Roberts, 468 U.S. at 624 (citing Lerman & Sanderson, supra note 122, at 239).
2 See Lerman & Sanderson, supra note 122, at 239; Joshua A. Bloom, Comment, The
Use of Local Ordinances to Combat Private Club Discrimination, 23 U.S.F. L. REV. 473, 474
(1989) ('Title II is notable in that it does not expressly prohibit discrimination on the basis of
sex. Many state anti-discrimination statutes have filled the void, however, and do expressly
prohibit discrimination on the basis of sex.") (citation omitted).
248 See Board of Dirs. of Rotary Int'l v. Rotary Club, 481 U.S. 537, 549 (1987) (conclud-
ing that California's Unruh Act "plainly serv[es]" an interest in assuring equal access to women)
(citation omitted); Roberts, 468 U.S. at 624-25 (stating that Minnesota's Human Rights Act was
enacted to eliminate discrimination against African-Americans and, as later amended, women).
249 See Lerman & Sanderson, supra note 122, at 240-86 (discussing the drafting of mod-
em PAAs).
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ity of racially exclusive clubs were owned and/or operated by whites,
making a court's duty to distinguish the "discriminated" from the
"discriminator" an easy one. In the decades since the end of govern-
mentally sanctioned racial discrimination, however, the nation has
seen a proliferation of associations organized to serve the communal
and cultural interests of African-Americans.250 In order to maintain
their cultural identities, many of these groups, such as the UAM, have
instituted policies that exclude whites from obtaining full member-
ship. In such situations, the historical mirror has become inverted,
pitting African-Americans in the role of discriminating against whites
solely because of their race. If the current tenor of race relations in
America is any indication, the future of racial discrimination litigation
holds an onslaught of claim brought by whites against such racially
discriminatory black organizations. Unfortunately, Southgate's claim
is a harbinger of things to come.
Any claim brought under a state's PAA seeking to protect the
rights of whites against the discriminatory policies of African-
American clubs will be evaluated under the Roberts framework.
Neither Roberts nor its progeny suggest that a different approach
must be used when dealing with "reverse discrimination." At first
blush, such a race-neutral standard would seem to dictate that the
right of expressive association held by all-black groups is no
"stronger or weaker than the parallel claim of [white] clubs." ' Un-
der this view, the strength of the right to discriminate proclaimed by
the UAM is equal to that of the KKK, the race of the excluded being
irrelevant.
The key to differentiating the effects of governmental action on
all-white and all-black groups is the extent to which forced integra-
tion would impair the group's message. In accordance with the Rob-
erts framework, governmental bodies acting in the name of eliminat-
ing discrimination will be deemed to have acted unconstitutionally
only if they "seek to impose penalties or withhold benefits from indi-
viduals because of their membership .... attempt to require disclosure
of the fact of membership in a group seeking anonymity, [or]. *.., 
to interfere with the internal organization or affairs of the group.'
Such infringements would violate a group's associational freedom
because admission of unwanted individuals runs the risk of impairing
250 See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
251 Buss, supra note 104, at 853; see also Marshall, supra note 78, at 98 ("The state is not
favoring whites over blacks; it is only requiring both groups to be treated equally. It is therefore
irrelevant to equal access goals whether the membership exclusion is directed at an historically
disadvantaged minority group.").
252 Roberts, 468 U.S. at 622-23.
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the ability of the group's original members "to express only those
views that brought them together.
' '253
In general, contemporary African-American organizations are
established around the premise of protecting the rights of African-
Americans against the racially biased actions of the white majority.
In essence, these groups are borne of rebellion against such ra-
cially discriminatory practices, i.e., their founding principles are nec-
essarily race-specific. To be exclusionary is not a capricious choice
on the part of these organizations; rather, it is a reflection of their very
nature.' For example, the UAM was established as a "'sanctuary'
from racism where people of African descent can convene 'without
any input from persons who harbor racial animus toward Afri-
cans. ' ' '2 s The UAM's "'absolute refusal to allow Caucasians ' , '2 6 in
to its meetings is an extension of its overarching purpose, and a
means by which the group is able to maintain its racial identity.
Forcing the UAM and similar groups to admit members of the race it
was established to provide protection against would be the ultimate
distortion of the group's message. All-white groups, on the other
hand, do not, as a general matter, share this essential racial nature. To
argue, for example, that an exclusionary golf course is somehow a
reflection of the nature of whites is far from convincing. Their ra-
cially exclusive policies, then, do not spring from their "racial nature"
but rather their historic desire to keep out social undesirables. These
organizations, rather than acting as safe havens against bias, are in
reality a modern-day reflection of the sort of racially discriminatory
society federal and state legislation has sought to eliminate. As such,
forced integration would be of much greater harm to an all-black club
than to an all-white club; the all-black club would be forced to turn its
back on its founding principles, while the all-white club would merely
be inconvenienced. Accordingly, the associational freedoms claimed
by all-white clubs should necessarily be more narrowly construed
than those allowed to all-black associations.
253 Id. at 623.
254 Obviously, this will not be true of every group that decides to exclude whites from
membership. For example, an African-American bowling team would be unable to justify its
discriminatory practices based on its "black nature." As outlined by the Roberts trilogy, the
strength of a discriminatory club's argument "depend[s on the actual set of messages the club is
engaged in advocating." Buss, supra note 104, at 853.
255 New York City Comn'n on Human Rights v. United African Movement, No.
MPA95-0851/PA95-0031, at 4 (N.Y.C.C.H.R. June 30, 1997) (recommended decision and
order) (citations omitted).256 Id. (citations omitted).
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B. The Government's Anti-Discrimination Interest
A court's finding that the application of a PAA's anti-
discrimination regulations would wreak an unconstitutional infringe-
ment upon an all-black organization does not resolve the issue under
Roberts. One must analyze the other side of the balancing test, that
is, the state's interest in eliminating discrimination. In this regard, the
difficult question that courts will likely confront with increasing fre-
quency in the coming years is whether a governmental interest in fa-
vor of eliminating discrimination against whites is of such a "com-
pelling" nature as to justify significant infringement on the associa-
tional freedoms of exclusively black organizations. To analyze this
question, it is necessary to focus on the two main rationales upon
which protection from racial discrimination has been sanctioned: pro-
viding equal access and preventing stigma. By applying these justifi-
cations to both whites and blacks, it becomes clear that any interest
against discrimination is of a much less "compelling" nature when
used to justify infringement on an all-black association.
1. Equal Access
The "strongest state interest for regulating the associational
choices of private clubs is assuring that excluded group members en-
joy equal opportunity to tangible economic goods and services, in-
cluding access to the commercial world of clients and contacts."5 7 A
"compelling state interest[] of the highest order,"5 8 the ideal of equal
access to business contacts and training, grows out of the broader
governmental interest in assuring unrestricted access to opportunities
open to other segments of society. A basic tenet of civil rights juris-
prudence, that of providing equal access to the advantages and op-
portunities offered in public accommodations, has been employed by
the Supreme Court mainly to prohibit discrimination against histori-
cally disadvantaged groups (especially African-Americans) in public
arenas such as housing259 and education.2 ° In fact, the whole history
of race discrimination cases amounts to "a one-way model of desired
access-blacks seeking the status and privilege accorded to whites
. ,,261 According to Laurence Tribe, this "one-way" jurisprudence
has developed because "blacks [have] wished access to the dignity
and power that went with roles which were the exclusive province of
257 Buss, supra note 104, at 852.
258 Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 624 (1984).
259 See, e.g., Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968) (upholding the constitu-
tionality of 42 U.S.C. § 1982 as "forbidding all racial discrimination").
260 See, e.g., Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976) (upholding the constitutionality of
42 U.S.C. § 1981 as applied to racially discriminatory policies of private schools).
261 TRIBE, supra note 82, §16-27, at 1569.
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whites .... ,,262 To put a finer point on it, he adds "there were never
any roles dominated by blacks to which whites wished access-be-
cause the only role ever exclusively occupied or even dominated by
blacks was that of slave." 263 The broad language employed by states
in drafting their PAAs reflects the expansive scope of this interest.
264
However, the broad range of protection guaranteed by these laws
should not blur the original intention of these acts: the protection of
society's minority groups.265 The Roberts Court made this point very
clear, stating:
This expansive definition [of Minnesota's public accommo-
dations law] reflects a recognition of the changing nature of
the American economy and of the importance, both to the in-
dividual and to society, of removing the barriers to economic
advancement and political and social integration that have
historically plagued certain disadvantaged groups, including
women.
26 6
When applied to private clubs, however, the argument in favor of
equal access must be modified because such clubs, by their very na-
ture, do not offer services to the general public.267 In the Roberts tril-
ogy, the Supreme Court recognized that such private organizations,
while not offering "public opportunities," do, however, offer special
business skills and advantages that would be otherwise unavailable to
the excluded group. The Roberts Court affirmed the lower court rul-
ing that the "various commercial programs and benefits offered to
[Jaycees] members" placed the group within the jurisdiction of Min-
nesota's public accommodations law because "'[leadership skills are
"goods," [and] business contacts and employment promotions are
"privileges" and "advantages". ... ,,,268 In accordance with this ex-
pansion of the equal access rationale, the Court went on to hold that
"[a]ssuring women equal access to such goods, privileges, and ad-
vantages clearly furthers compelling state interests., 269 The applica-
tion of a governmental interest in favor of equal access to business
22 Id. at § 16-27, at 1569 n.33 (emphasis added).
263 id.
264 See Lerman & Sanderson, supra note 122, at 240-43 (discussing the principles behind
the broad drafting of state PAAs).
265 See supra notes 177-85 and accompanying text.
266 Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 626 (1984) (emphasis added).
267 See Marshall, supra note 78, at 92 ("The force of the equal access argument is initially
less obvious when applied to the so-called 'private' organization.").
26 Roberts, 468 U.S. at 626 (quoting United States Jaycees v. McClure 305 N.W. 2d 764,
772 (Minn. 1981)); see also Marshall, supra note 78, at 92-93 ("The strength of the Roberts
opinion ... is its recognition that exclusion from private non-commercial organizations may
deny equal access as well.").
269 Roberts, 468 U.S. at 626.
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contacts (or "goods") provided by private organizations has become
entrenched in the jurisprudence of associational freedoms. 270
At least one recent Supreme Court decision dealing with a dis-
puted affirmative action program threatens to open up the door to
claims brought by whites who have been excluded from a group (or
from opportunities) solely because of their race. Such lawsuits have
added a new dimension to the traditional Roberts analysis. In Ada-
rand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena,271 the Court reviewed a federal af-
firmative action program designed to provide highway construction
contracts to disadvantaged business enterprises, contracts presump-
tively awarded on the basis of race.27 2 In attempting to give shape to
the numerous holdings dealing with race-based affirmative action
programs, the Court set forth "three general propositions with respect
to governmental racial classifications. 273 According to the Court,
these three guidelines are:
First, skepticism: "Any preference based on racial or ethnic
criteria must necessarily receive a most searching examina-
tion." Second, consistency: "The standard of review under
the Equal Protection Clause is not dependent on the race of
those burdened or benefited by a particular classification,"
i.e., all racial classifications reviewable under the Equal Pro-
tection Clause must be strictly scrutinized. And third, con-
gruence: "Equal protection analysis in the Fifth Amendment
area is the same as that under the Fourteenth Amendment."
274
While the constitutionality of affirmative action programs obvi-
ously implicates constitutional questions beyond those dealt with in
an associational freedom analysis, the adoption of Adarand's "con-
sistency" principle could result in a correlative expansion of the
270 See, e.g., Board of Dirs. of Rotary Int'l v. Rotary Club, 481 U.S. 537, 549 (1987) ("In
Roberts we recognized that the State's compelling interest in assuring equal access to women
extends to the acquisition of leadership skills and business contacts as well as tangible goods
and services.") (citation omitted); Invisible Empire of the Knights of the KKK v. Mayor of
Thurmont, 700 F. Supp. 281, 289 (D. Md. 1988) ("The state has a compelling interest in ensur-
ing equal access to such advantages as business and professional opportunities and skills.")
(citation omitted); see also Frank, supra note 203, at 38 ("When people are barred from those
organizations, they are also barred from cultivating business opportunities, and from influencing
policy through informal contact with policymakers. Being in the 'right' club can be crucial to
one's career.") (citation omitted); Marshall, supra note 78, at 92-94 (evaluating the validity of a
state's interest in equal access as applied to private organizations); Rhode, supra note 155, at
120-21 (arguing that, in the context of gender-exclusive clubs, "[t]he most direct harms involve
lost opportunities for the social status, informal exchanges, and personal contacts that men's
associations traditionally have provided").
271 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
272 See id. at 205-06.
273 Id. at 223.
274 Id. at 223-24 (citations omitted).
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"equal access" interest in the favor of whites. Under the Adarand
approach, "any person, of whatever race, has the right to demand that
any governmental actor subject to the Constitution justify any racial
classification subjecting that person to unequal treatment under the
strictest judicial scrutiny."275 In this view, exclusion alone justifies
the invocation of the "equal access" principle, with the race of the
excluded party playing no role in determining the "compelling" na-
ture of that interest. Courts throughout the country have seized upon
this ruling as the basis for overturning affirmative action programs
that foster the inclusion of African-Americans and other minorities at
the expense of whites.276  Broad application of this principle to the
Roberts framework would expand the governmental interest justifying
infringement on private groups on grounds of equal access to "any
individual . . . [who] is disadvantaged . . . because of his or her
race, 277 thus posing a serious threat to the constitutional protection
presently enjoyed by minority clubs.
Justifying the inclusion of whites in all-black clubs on the basis
of assuring equal access to goods and opportunities available only to
club members rings hollow for two reasons. First, minority clubs gen-
erally will have a "less ample supply of goods and services and a
lower level of power and influence to offer" whites.278 While this
characterization may not be universally true, the cases upon which the
equal access principle was established demonstrate that private
groups in which minorities have fought to be included constitute
highly organized social and fraternal networks of people who, in ac-
cordance with their historic status in society's majority, have become
privy to the type of business opportunities that excluded groups justi-
275 Id. at 224 (emphasis added); see also Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S.
265, 289-90 (1978) ("The guarantee of equal protection cannot mean one thing when applied to
one individual and something else when applied to a person of another color.").
276 See Messer v. Meno, 130 F.3d 130 (5th Cir. 1997) (reversing award of summary
judgment to defendant employer on the issue of whether the challenged affirmative action pro-
gram impermissibly discriminated against the white female plaintiff); Monterey Mechanical Co.
v. Wilson, 125 F.3d 702 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding that a statute which required general contrac-
tors to subcontract a percentage of work to subcontractors owned by women or minorities vio-
lated the Equal Protection Clause); Engineering Contractors Ass'n of S. Fla. v. Metropolitan
Dade County, 122 F.3d 895 (11th Cir. 1997) (affirming ruling that an affirmative action pro-
gram requiring that race-, ethnic-, and gender-conscious measures be taken in awarding county
construction projects violated equal protection guarantees); Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932 (5th
Cir. 1996), cert. denied 518 U.S. 1033 (1996) (holding that a state university law school's ad-
missions program violated the Equal Protection Clause).
277 Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 230 (1995); see also Richmond v.
J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 494 (1989) (holding that the standard of review for affirmative
action programs "is not dependent on the race of those burdened or benefited by a particular
classification").
278 Buss, supra note 104, at 852; see also Herma Hill Kay, Private Clubs and Public In-
terests: A View from San Francisco, 67 WASH. U. L.Q. 855 (1989) (discussing the City of San
Francisco's legislative action with respect to sex segregation in private clubs, and the clubs'
response).
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fiably envy.279 In contrast, African-American clubs which have
sought constitutional sanction for their discriminatory policies do not,
as of yet, offer such opportunities as would be enviable to whites.
This is a function of the long-standing role blacks have been forced to
play as societal "undesirables," discouraged from forming such clubs
until recent years, and denied the opportunities to build social and
economic connections themselves. This simple social reality is ig-
nored by commentators who argue that it is society in general that is
harmed by discrimination and who conclude, therefore, that equal
access goals are equally as valid whether employed by the majority or
minority race.280 However unfortunate, the fact remains that the busi-
ness contacts that would be made available to whites were they in-
cluded in an exclusively black organization are not so compelling as
to justify such a substantial infringement on that group's First
Amendment rights.281
Secondly, under the Roberts framework, governmental infringe-
ments on a group's expressive association must be in pursuance of
interests which can not be achieved through "means significantly less
restrictive of associational freedoms. 282 Assuming that a court finds
such "compelling" contacts in an all-black club, the social advantage
whites enjoy as the majority race in society would facilitate their
ability to make those contacts through alternative means. On the other
end of the scale, African-Americans seeking access to the vast net-
work of business and social contacts established by white clubs over
the course of decades, or even centuries, will have a comparably more
difficult road to hoe. Under the "balancing test" analysis prescribed
by the Roberts trilogy, this difference seems to tip the scale heavily in
favor of all-black organizations resisting judicially mandated integra-
tion.
279 See, e.g., Board of Dirs. of Rotary Int'l v. Rotary Club, 481 U.S. 537, 539-40 (1987)
(describing the classification system employed by Rotary Club International, a nonprofit corpo-
ration, established to "ensure 'that each Rotary Club includes a representative of every worthy
and recognized business, professional, or institutional activity in the community') (citations
omitted); Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 612-14 (1984) (describing the organ-
izational and hierarchical structure of the Jaycees).
280 See Marshall, supra note 78, at 92, 97-98 ("From a purely equal access standpoint,
both society and the individual are harmed when any person is denied access to opportunity on
the basis of race or ethnic origin .... For this reason, a question necessarily arises whether the
state has a greater interest in promoting one group's access over another's .... [By admitting
whites into private all-black clubs,] [t]he state is not favoring whites over blacks; it is only re-
quiring both groups to be treated equally. It is therefore irrelevant to equal access goals whether
the membership exclusion is directed at an historically disadvantaged minority group.").
281 This is not to say, however, that African-American groups will be unable to obtain
such desirable contacts with time. In fact, it can be argued that the current trend toward all-black
clubs is a reflection of a change in the nation's racial climate which, in the long run, may make
the "goods" held by such clubs equally as desirable as those held by historically all-white clubs.
282 Roberts, 468 U.S. at 623; see also South Boston Allied War Veterans Council v. City
of Boston, 875 F. Supp. 891, 916-17 (D. Md. 1995) (discussing alternatives available for gay




A second basis for states' compelling interest in eradicating dis-
crimination is the prevention of "stigma." Exclusion from private
clubs on the basis of race has the effect of perpetuating and lending
societal legitimacy to the stereotypes and perceptions of inferiority
upon which such discriminatory policies are based.2 3  The govern-
mental interest in preventing race-based stigma was originally in-
tended to benefit African-Americans who suffered the indignities of
segregation. The compelling nature of this original judicial intent was
made clear in Brown v. Board of Education, 2M wherein the Supreme
Court overruled the "separate but equal" doctrine2 5 in public schools.
The Brown Court reasoned that the racial segregation of African-
American schoolchildren "generates a feeling of inferiority as to their
status in the community that may affect their hearts and minds in a
way unlikely ever to be undone." 6  While the Court offered many
rationales for its decision, the prevention of stigma was not only
"[t]he most obvious," but also "the most persuasive.' 'W In the dec-
ades since Brown, this protection of African-Americans against social
perceptions of inferiority has become established as a pillar of the
Supreme Court's civil rights jurisprudence. 28
The debate over the legitimacy of this rationale, however, is the
subject of controversy among scholars. On one side, some commen-
tators wholeheartedly embrace the Brown Court's rationale of protec-
283 See Frank, supra note 203, at 36 ("Discrimination at any age also reinforces negative
stereotypes about people."). Furthermore, Frank also argues that discrimination in organizations
reinforces stereotypes by fostering "an acceptance of discrimination." Id.
24 347 U.S. 483 (1954).285 See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
286 Brown, 347 U.S. at 494. The Brown Court quoted at length the findings of the district
court which stated, in pertinent part, "'[slegregation of white and colored children in public
schools has a detrimental. effect upon the colored children .... A sense of inferiority affects the
motivation of a child to learn."' ld. (citation omitted). Despite these findings, the district court
held in favor of the segregated school system. See id (citation omitted); see also TRIBE, supra
note 82, § 12-6, at 821 ("So it was that the Court invalidated segregation by law in public
schools in [Brown] because that system unavoidably communicated a social message of black
inferiority, regardless of the surface symmetry of the separate-but-equal concept .....
287 TRIBE, supra note 82, § 16-15, at 1477.
28 See Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 625 (1984) ("[Gender discrimina-
tion] deprives persons of their individual dignity and denies society the benefits of wide partici-
pation in political, economic, and cultural life .... That stigmatizing injury, and the denial of
equal opportunities that accompanies it, is surely felt as strongly by persons suffering discrimi-
nation on the basis of their sex as by those treated differently because of their race."); Heart of
Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 250 (1964) ("The Senate Commerce Com-
mittee made it quite clear that the fundamental object of Title II [of the Civil Rights Act of
1964] was to vindicate 'the deprivation of personal dignity that surely accompanies denials of
equal access to public establishments."') (citations omitted).
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tion against social stigma. Laurence Tribe, for example, has written
that "[r]acial separation by force of law conveys strong social stigma
and perpetuates both the stereotypes of racial inferiority and the cir-
cumstances on which such stereotypes feed. ' 289 According to Tribe,
the Brown Court, having recognized the detrimental impact of such
stigma, justified its holding "less in apartheid's mutual separation of
the races than in its allowing one race to enjoy full communal life in
society, while effectively ostracizing members of another race."29°
Opponents of this view, such as Ronald Dworkin, argue that "it is not
true... that any social policy is unjust if those whom it puts at a dis-
advantage feel insulted."29' According to Dworkin, "[i]f segregation
does improve the general welfare, even when the disadvantage to
blacks is fully taken into account, and if other reason can be found
why segregation is nevertheless unjustified, then the insult blacks
feel, while understandable, must be based on misperception."
292
The more pressing question which courts will confront, as dem-
onstrated in Southgate's claim against the UAM, is whether the ex-
clusion of whites from all-black clubs brands whites with an analo-
gous stigma, thus warranting their compelled inclusion in spite of the
substantial impact it may have on the group's associational freedoms.
The Supreme Court, however, has not yet had the opportunity to di-
rectly confront the issue of the constitutionality of applying public
accommodations laws to black-only groups on grounds of stigma. At
disparate times, however, the Court has given indications it may be
unwilling to allow such a justification. In Regents of the University of
California v. Bakke,293 Justice Brennan, in favor of upholding a medi-
cal school's set-aside program for the benefit of racial minorities, ar-
gued that excluding whites, "[u]nlike discrimination against racial
minorities . . . does not inflict a pervasive injury upon individual
whites in the sense that wherever they go or whatever they do there is
289 TRInE, supra note 82, § 16-15, at 1477.
290 Id.; see also Charles Black, The Lawfulness of the Segregation Decisions, 69 YALE
LJ. 421, 424 (1960) ("[l]f a whole race of people finds itself confined within a system which is
set up and continued for the very purpose of keeping it in an inferior station, and if the question
is then solemnly propounded whether such a race is being treated 'equally,' I think we ought to
exercise one of the sovereign prerogatives of philosophers-that of laughter. The only question
remaining (after we get our laughter under control) is whether the segregation system answers to
this description. Here I must confess to a tendency to start laughing all over again.'); Rhode,
supra note 155, at 108 ("As a symbolic matter, exclusion of women, like that of racial minori-
ties or religious minorities, carries a stigma that affects individuals' social status and self-
perception.").
291 RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGSr SERIOUSLY 231 (1977).
292 Id.; see also Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73
HARv. L. REv 1 (1959) (criticizing the Brown Court's reliance on social science data).293 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
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significant likelihood that they will be treated as second-class citizens
because of their color." 294
The recent guidelines for interpreting affirmative action pro-
grams laid down in Adarand, however, seem to send a clear signal
that the current Court is at least willing to entertain arguments in fa-
vor of integrating all-black clubs on grounds that exclusion stigma-
tizes whites. If, under the principles of "skepticism" and "consis-
tency," racial exclusions are to be viewed through one analysis, re-
gardless of the race of the party discriminated against, then the next
logical step in an associational freedom analysis would be that the
effects of the stigma must also be viewed independent of race. At
least one court has applied the Adarand principles as dictating the
recognition of a state's interest in preventing harm to any individual's
personal dignity as "compelling." The court in South Boston Allied
War Veterans Council v. City of Boston295 analyzed the constitution-
ality of a city's predicating the issuance of a parade permit to a veter-
ans organization on its adherence to a non-discrimination law. De-
spite its holding that forcing the veterans to include a homosexual
group in its parade would be an unconstitutional infringement of the
veterans' associational rights, the court still entertained the homosex-
ual group's argument that such inclusion was justified to prevent the
"stigma" which would result from exclusion. The South Boston court
stated:
Neither the Supreme Court, nor any other court, however, has
addressed the issue of whether there is a compelling state in-
terest in preventing discrimination which deprives a person
of his or her individual dignity, but not of any publicly avail-
able goods, services, or opportunities for commercial or pro-
fessional advancement. . . . This court assumes, however,
that preventing the injury to individual dignity, or stigma,
caused by exclusion from an organization or activity is a
compelling state interest for the purpose of invoking the Rob-
erts test. 296
The problem with allowing whites to trample the First Amend-
ment rights of minority groups in the name of preventing stigma is the
same as that created by allowing such integration on equal access
294 Id at 375 (Brennan, White, Marshall & Blackmun, JJ., concurring in part and dis-
senting in part); see also United Jewish Orgs. v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144, 165-68 (1977) (upholding
legislative gerrymandering to benefit blacks because such plan "represented no racial slur or
stigma with respect to whites or any other race").
295 875 F. Supp. 891 (D. Mass. 1995).
296Id. at 916.
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grounds: it ignores the social reality of African-Americans' status as a
historically disadvantaged minority. In the words of Deborah Rhode:
Separatism imposed by empowered groups carries different
symbolic and practical significance than separatism chosen
by subordinate groups. Given this nation's historic traditions
and cultural understandings, the exclusion of men from
women's liberation groups or garden clubs no more conveys
inferiority than the exclusion of whites from black associa-
tions or Protestants from Jewish social organizations. Nor
does such exclusivity serve to perpetuate existing disparities
in political and economic power.
297
Allowing whites to utilize a "stigma" argument to force the inte-
gration of all-black clubs turns a blind eye to the fact that whites are
firmly entrenched as society's overwhelming majority. As such,
whites enjoy a social and economic advantage over African-
Americans. Racially discriminatory policies upheld by all-white298
clubs are manifestations of this position of power. The exclusion
of minorities from white private clubs carries an "implicit message of
... unworthiness" 299 which reaffirms society's inclination to perceive
minority groups as constituting an inferior class of persons. In turn,
these policies encourage stereotyping and lead to further stigmatiza-
tion of African-Americans. On the other hand, their respective posi-
tions in society dictate that the exclusion of whites from all-black
groups is unlikely to stigmatize whites with similar perceptions of
inferiority.300 The exclusion of whites from minority clubs "is likely
to... carry none of the stigmatizing insult" that has justified the en-
forcement of anti-discrimination laws in favor of African-
Americans.3 1 Furthermore, the fact that minority groups are centered
around a single shared racial or cultural identity diminishes the
weight of arguments that exclusion from such a group will attach any
stigma because the "exclusion is more likely to be perceived as an
attempt to promote its own identity rather than as a characterization of
the excluded group as an inferior class." 302 The discriminatory poli-
cies enforced by African-American organizations constitute a means
297 Rhode, supra note 155, at 122.
298 See generally Somers, supra note 2, at 26 (describing the history of exclusive clubs in
the United States).
299 Buss, supra note 104, at 852.
300 Id. ("[E]xclusion of majority members by minority groups is likely to hurt less and to
carry none of the stigmatizing insult that accompanies exclusion of minorities with its implicit
message of inferiority or unworthiness."); see also Marshall, supra note 78, at 98 ("Because of
their long historical entrenchment and dominance, neither whites nor possibly Christians are
susceptible to pervasive stereotyping as social inferiors.").
301 Buss, supra note 104, at 852.
302 Marshall, supra note 78, at 98.
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by which African-Americans alone seek to avoid the pervasive so-
cietal perceptions of inferiority, rather than mount a counterattack
against whites. Allowing a segment of society to band together in
protection of its heritage to the exclusion of others does not produce
any of the stigmatization that anti-discrimination laws are intended to
remedy. 30 3 To equate the "stigma" claimed by excluded whites with
the pervasive stigmatization and inferiority African-Americans have
suffered since the birth of this nation is to equate one group's hurt
feelings with the other's broken neck.
V. CONCLUSION
Under the framework provided by the Supreme Court in the
Roberts trilogy, the First Amendment provides a constitutional shield
of protection for the expressive association of a private club against
governmental infringement. This protection, however, is subject to
the compelling governmental interest in eliminating discrimination.
Social realities dictate that the nature of this interest becomes strik-
ingly less compelling when applied to force the inclusion of whites in
all-black clubs than when employed to integrate all-white clubs.
Many commentators, including Southgate,304 decry such poli-
cies as no more than reverse discrimination. 30 5  These naysayers,
however, miss the point. The racially discriminatory policies em-
ployed by African-American clubs such as the United African
Movement represent a means by which African-Americans seek not
only to protect themselves from racial prejudice and bias, but rather to
make heard the voice of the African-American community. As such,
they represent a valid exercise of an organization's freedom of ex-
pressive association, a fundamental right guaranteed by the First
Amendment.
In the words of Justice William 0. Douglas: "The associational
rights which our system honors permit all white, all black, all brown,
and all yellow clubs to be formed. They also permit all Catholic, all
Jewish, or all agnostic clubs to be established. Government may not
tell a man or woman who his or her associates must be.'3°6
SHAWN M. LARSEN'
303 See supra notes 283-88 and accompanying text.
304 See Whelan, supra note 10, at A12.305 See id. ("Equality is a two-way street. All Americans should of course enjoy their First
Amendment freedom of association .... But laws that bar racial discrimination should apply
equally to whites and blacks alike. Perhaps Louis Farrakhan is listening.").
306 Moose Lodge, No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 179-80 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
t As always, all my love and appreciation go to my wife, Brittany, whose never-failing
support has provided me with a constant source of strength.
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